TUHFES (ROUMANIA, ETC.).
A. D. 1402-1451.—Prostration and recovery. —Conquests of Mahomet and Amurath II.—’
It is one of the marvels of history that the Ottoman empire, broken and dismembered by Timour, recovered its vigor and re-entered upon a long career. After the fall of Bajazet, three fragments of his dominions were held by three of his surviving sons, while other portions were transferred by Timour to princes of the old Seljuk house. Civil war broke out between the brothers of the Ottoman race; it resulted in the triumph of Mahomet, the youngest (A. D. 1413), who reunited a large part of the dominions of his father. He reigned but eight years, which were years of peace for the Greeks, with whom Mahomet maintained a friendly intercourse. His son, Amurath II., was provoked to renew the state of war, and a formidable attack upon Constantinople wa9 made in August, 1422. The first assault failed, and disturbances at home recalled Amurath before he could repeat it. The Roman capital was reprieved for thirty years; but its trembling emperor paid tribute to the sultan and yielded most of the few cities that remained to him outside of his capital. The Ottoman power had become threatening again in Europe, and Servians, Bosnians, Albanians, Wallachians, Hungarians, and Poles now struck hands together in a combination, once more, to oppose it. “A severe struggle followed, which, after threatening the utter expulsion of the house of Othman from Europe, confirmed for centuries its dominion .in that continent, and wrought the heavier subjugation of those who were then seeking to release themselves from its superiority. In 1442 Amurath was repulsed from Belgrade; and his generals, who were besieging Hermanstadt, in Transylvania, met with a still more disastrous reverse. It was at Hermanstadt that the renowned Hunyades first appeared in the wars between the Hungarians and the Turks. He was the illegitimate son of Sigismond, King of Hungary, and the fair Elizabeth Morsiney. In his early youth he gained distinction in the wars of Italy; and Comines, in his memoirs, celebrates him under the name of the White Knight of Wallachia. After some campaigns in Western Christendom, Hunyades returned to protect his native country against the Ottomans.” At Hermanstadt, and again at Vasag. Hunyades defeated the Turks with great slaughter and rivalled them in the ferocity with which his prisoners were treated. His fame now gave a great impulse to the Crusade against the Turks which Pope Eugenius had preached, and drew volunteers to his standard from all the nations of the West. In 1443. Hunyades led a splendid and powerful army across the Danube near Semendra. drove the Turks beyond the Balkans, forced the passage of the mountains witli a boldness and a skill that is compared with the exploits of Hannibal and Napoleon, and ex
torted from the Sultan a treaty (of Szegeddin, July 12, 1444) which rescued a large Christian territory from the Moslem yoke. “The Sultan resigned all claims upon Servia and recognised George Brankovich as its independent sovereign. Wallachia was given up to Hungary.” But the peace which this treaty secured was brief; Christian perfidy destroyed it, and the penalty was paid by whole centuries of suffering and shame for the Christians of the Danubian states. “Within a month from the signature of the treaty of Szegeddin the Pope and the Greek Emperor had persuaded the King of Hungary and his councillors to take an oath to break the oath which had been pledged to the Sultan. They represented that the confessed weakness of the Ottomans, and the retirement of Amurath [who had placed his son Mahomet on the throne and withdrawn from the cares of sovereignty] to Asia, gave an opportunity for eradicating the Turks from Europe which ought to be fully employed. The Cardinal Julian [legate of the Pope] pacified the conscientious misgivings which young King Ladislaus expressed, by his spiritual authority in giving dispensation and absolution in the Pope’s name. … On the 1st of Sept., the King, the legate, and Hunyades, marched against the surprised and unprepared Turks with an army of 10.000 Poles and Hungarians. The temerity which made them expect to destroy the Turkish power in Europe with so slight a force was equal to the dishonesty of their enterprise.” They advanced through Bulgaria to the Black Sea, and southward along its coast as far as Varna, which they took. There they were called to account. Amurath had resumed the sceptre, put himself at the head of 40,000 of the best warriors of Islam and on the 10th November he dashed them upon the Christian forces at Varna, with the broken treaty borne like a banner at their head. His victory was overwhelming. Cardinal Julian and the King of Hungary were both among the slain. Hunyades fled with a little remnant of followers and escaped to try fortune in other fields. “This overthrow did not bring immediate ruin upon Hungary, but it was fatal to the Sclavonic neighbours of the Ottomans, who had joined the Hungarian King against them. Servia and Bosnia were thoroughly reconquered by the Mahometans; and the ruin of these Christian nations, which adhered to the Greek Church, was accelerated by the religious intolerance with which they were treated by their fellow Christians of Hungary and Poland, who obeyed the Pope and hated the Greek Church as heretical. . . . The bigotry of the Church of Home in preaching up a crusade against the sect of the Patarenes, which was extensively spread in that country [Bosnia], caused the speedy and complete annexation of an important frontier province to the Ottoman Empire. Seventy Bosnian fortresses are said to have opened their gates to the Turks within eight days. The royal house of Bosnia was annihilated, and many of her chief nobles embraced Mahometanism to avoid a similar doom.” After once more attempting to escape from the throne, and being recalled by domestic disturbances, Amurath reigned yet six years, extending his dominions in the Peloponnesus, defeating once more his old antagonist. Hunyades. who invaded Servia (1448), but being successfully defied in Albania by the heroic Scanderbeg. He died in Creasy, Hist, of the Ottoman
of Constantinople.
1451.—Sir E Turks, eh. 4.
Also In: L. Ranke, Hist, of Servia, eh. 2.—E. Szabad, Hungary, pt. 1, eh. 3-4.—A. Lamartine, Hist, of Turkey, bk. 10-11.
A. b. 1451-1481.— Conquest of Constantinople.—The Empire organized and perfected by Mahomet II.—Mahomet II., son of Amurath II., “finished the work of his predecessors; he made the Ottoman power in Europe what it has been ever since. He gave a systematic form to the customs of his house and to the dominion which he had won. His first act was the murder of his infant brother, and he made the murder of brothers a standing law of his Empire. He overthrew the last remnants of independent Roman rule, of independent Greek nationality, and he fixed the relations which the Greek part of his subjects were to bear both towards their Turkish masters and towards their Christian fellow-subjects. He made the northern and western frontiers of his Empire nearly what they still remain. The Ottoman Empire, in short, as our age has to deal with it, is, before all things, the work of Mahomet the Conqueror. The prince whose throne was fixed in the New Rome held altogether another place from even the mightiest of his predecessors. Mahomet had reigned two years, he had lived twenty-three, on the memorable day, May 29th 1453, when the Turks entered the city of the Ccesars and when the last Emperor, Constantine, died in the breach [see Constantinople: A. D. 1453]. . . . And now that the Imperial city was at last taken, Mahomet seemed to make it his policy both to gather in whatever remained uuconquered, and to bring most of the states which had hitherto been tributary under his direct rule. Greece itself, though it had been often ravaged by the Turks, had not been added to their dominions. The Emperors had, in the very last days of the Empire before the fall of Constantinople, recovered all Peloponnesos, except some points which were held by Venice. Frank Dukes also reigned at Athens, and another small duchy lingered on in the islands of Leukas and Kephallenia and on the coasts of Akarnania. The Turkish conquest of the mainland, again saving the Venetian points, was completed by the year 1460, but the two western islands were not taken until 1479. Euboia was conquered in 1471. . . . The Empire of Trebizond was conquered in 1461, and the island of Lesbos or Mitylene in 1463. There was now no independent Greek state left. Crete, Corfu, and some smaller islands and points of coast, were held by Venice, and some of the islands of the ^Egean were still ruled by Frank princes and by the Knights of Saint John. But. after the fall of Trebizond, there was no longer any independent Greek state anywhere, and the part of the Greek nation which was under Christian rulers of any kind was now far smaller than the part which was under the Turk. While the Greeks were thus wholly subdued, the Slaves fared no better. In 1459 Servia was reduced from a tributary principality to an Ottoman province, and six years later Bosnia was annexed also. . . . One little fragment of the great Slavonic power in those lands alone remained. The little district of Zeta, a part of the Servian kingdom, was never fully conquered by the Turks. One part of it, the mountain district called Tseruagora or Montenegro, has kept its
independence to our times. Standing as an outpost of freedom and Christendom amid surrounding bondage, the Black Mountain has been often attacked, it has been several times overrun, but it has never been conquered. … To the south of them, the Christian Albanians held out for a long time under their famous chief George Castriot or Scanderbeg. After his death in 1459, they also came under the yoke. These conquests of Mahomet gave the Ottoman dominion in Europe nearly the same extent which it has now. His victories had been great, but they were balanced by some defeats. The conquest of Servia and Bosnia opened the way to endless inroads into Hungary, South-eastern Germany and North-eastern Italy. But as yet these lands were merely ravaged, and the Turkish power met with some reverses. In 1456 Belgrade was saved by the last victory of Huniades [see HunGary: A. D. 1442-1458], and this time Mahomet the Conqueror had to flee. In another part of Europe, if in those days it is to be counted for Europe, Mahomet won the Genoese possessions in the peninsula of Crimea [A. D. 1475], and the Tartar Khans who ruled in that peninsula and the neighbouring lands became vassals of the Sultan. . . . The last years of Mahomet’s reign were marked by a great failure and a great success. He failed to take Rhodes [A. D. 1480], which belonged to the Knights of Saint John; but his troops suddenly seized on Otrauto in Southern Italy. Had this post been kept, Italy might have fallen as well as Greece; but the Conqueror died the next year, and Otranto was won back.”—E. A. Freeman, The Ottoman Pouter in Europe, eh. 4.
Also In: A. Lamartine, Hi*t. of Turkey, bk. 12-13. —Sir E. S. Creasy, Hilt, of the Ottoman Turks, eh. 5-6. — E. Gibbon, Decline mid Fall of the Iio/imn Empire, eh. 68. — See, also, Italy: A. D. 1447-1480.
A. D. 1454-1479.—Treaty with Venice, followed by war. See Greece: A. D. 1454-1479.
A. D. 1479.—Defeat at Kenyer-Meso by the Hungarians and Wallachians. See Hungary: A. D. 1471-1487.
A. D. 1481-1520.—The sad story of Prince Jem and the Christians.—Massacre of the Shiites.—Selim’s conquests in Persia, Syria and Egypt.—The Sultan becomes the successor of the Khalifs, the chief of Islam.— “The long reign of Bayezid [or Bajazet] II. (1481-1512) which surpassed that of his father and grandfather, so that the three together nearly completed a century, was marked by a general lethargy and incapacity on the part of the Turkish Government. . . . Family dissensions were indeed the leading incidents of Bayezid’s reign, and for many years he was kept in a state of anxious uncertainty by the ingenious intrigues of the Christian Powers concerning the custody of his brother, the unfortunate Prince Jem. The adventures of Prince Jem (the name is short for Jemshid, but in Europe it has been written Ziziin) cast a very unpleasant light upon the honour of the Christians of his time, and (‘specially upon the Knights of Rhodes. Of the two sons of Mohammed II. Jem was undoubtedly the one who was by nature fitted to be his successor. . . . Jem however, was not the first to hear of his father’s death, and a year’s warfare against his brother ended in his own defeat. The younger prince then sought refuge with the Knights of Rhodes, who promised to receive him hospitably, and to find him a way to Europe, where he intended to renew his opposition to his brother’s authority. D’Aubusson, the Grand Master of Rhodes, was too astute a diplomatist to sacrifice the solid gains that he perceived would accrue to his Order for the sake of a few paltry twinges of conscience; and he had no- sooner made sure of Prince Jem’s person, and induced him to sign a treaty, by which, in the event of his coming to the throne, the Order was to reap many sterling advantages, than he ingeniously opened negotiations with Sultan Bayezid, with a view to ascertain how much gold that sovereign was willing to pay for the safe custody of his refractory brother. It is only fair to say that Bayezid, who had no particle of cruelty in his nature, did all he could to come to terms with Jem. . . . All negotiation and compromise having proved ineffectual, he listened to the proposals of the crafty Grand Master, and finally agreed to pay him 45,000 ducats a year, so long as he kept Jem under his surveillance. The Knights of St. John possessed many commanderies, and the one they now selected for Jem’s entertainment was at Nice, in the south of France. In 1482 he arrived there, wholly_ unconscious of the plots that were being woven about him. … On one pretext or another the knights contrived to keep their prisoner at Nice for several months, and then transferred him to Rousillon, thence to Puy, and next to Sassenage, where the monotonies of captivity were relieved by the delights of love, which he shared with the daughter of the commandant, the beautiful Philipine Helene, his lawful spouse being fortunately away in Egypt. . . . Meanwhile Grand Master D’Aubusson was driving a handsome trade in his capacity of jailor. All the potentates of Europe were anxious to obtain possession of the claimant to the Ottoman throne, and were ready to pay large sums in hard cash to enjoy the privilege of using this specially dangerous instrument against the Sultan’s peace. D’Aubusson was not averse to taking the money, but he did not wish to give up his captive; and his knightly honour felt no smirch in taking 20,000 ducats from Jem’s desolate wife (who probably had not heard of the fair Helfine) as the price of her husband’s release, while he held him all the tighter. Of such chivalrous stuff were made the famous knights of Rhodes; and of such men as D’Aubusson the Church made cardinals! A new influence now appeared upon the scene of Jem’s captivity. Charles VIII. of France considered that the Grand Master had made enough profit out of the unlucky prince, and the king resolved to work the oracle himself. His plan was to restore Jem to a nominal sultanate by the aid of Matthias Corvinus, Ferdinand of Naples, and the Pope. He took Jem out of the hands of the knights, and transferred him to the custody of Innocent VIII., who kindly consented to take care of the prince for the sum of 40.000 ducats a year, to be paid by his grateful brother at Constantinople.” Innocent’s successor, the terrible Borgia, Alexander VI., unsatisfied with this liberal allowance, opened negotiations with Constantinople looking to the payment of some heavy lump sum for summary riddance of poor Jem. But the sinister bargain was interrupted by Charles VIII. of France, who invaded Italy at this juncture, passed through Rome, and took the captive
Conquest8 of Selim.
prince in his train when he went on to Naples. Jem died on the way, and few have doubted that Pope Alexander poisoned him, as he had poisoned many before. “The curious conclusion one draws from the whole melancholy tale is, that there was not apparently a single honest prince in Christendom to take compassion upon the captive.” In 1512 Bayezid was deposed by his son Selim, and did not long survive the humiliation. To avoid troubles of the Prince Jem character, Selim slew all his brothers and nephews, eleven in number, making a family solitude around the throne. Then he prepared himself for foreign conquest by exterminating the sometimes troublesome sect of the Shias, or Shiites, in his dominions. “A carefully organized system of detectives, whom Selim distributed throughout his Asiatic provinces, revealed the fact that the number of the heretical sect reached the alarming total of 70,000. Selim . . . secretly massed his troops at spots where the heretics chiefly congregated, and at a given signal 40,000 of them were massacred or imprisoned. . . . Having got rid of the enemy within his gates, Selim now proceeded to attack the head of the Shias, the great Shah Ismail himself [the founder of the Sufi line of Persian sovereigns, who had lately established his authority over the provinces of Persia]. . . . Selim set forth with an army estimated at over 140,000 men, 80,000 of which were cavalry. . . . After weary and painful marching, the Ottomans forced Ismail to give battle at Chaldinm [or Tabreez —see Persia: A. D. 1499-1887],” and defeated him. “The victory of Chaldirau (1514) might have been followed by the conquest of Persia, but the privations which the soldiery had undergone had rendered them unmanageable, and Selim was forced to content himself with the annexation of the important provinces of Kurdistan and Dyarbekr, which are still part of the Turkish Empire; and then turned homewards, to prosecute other schemes of conquest. No peace, however, was concluded between him and the Shah, and a frontier war continued to be waged for many years. During the campaign against Persia, the Turks had been kept in anxiety by the presence on their flanks of the forces of the Mamluk Sultans of Egypt and Syria, whose frontiers now marched with the territory of the Ottomans.” Turning his arms against the Mamluks, “Selim set out in 1516 for Syria, and meeting the Mamluk army on the field of Marj Dabik near Aleppo, administered a terrible defeat, in which the aged Sultan El-Ghuri was trampled to death. He found a brave successor in Tuman Bey, but in the interval the Turks had mastered Syria and were advancing to Gaza. Here the Mamluks made another stand, but the generalship of Sinan Pasha was not to be resisted any more than the preponderance of his forces. The final battle was fought at Reydaniya in the neighbourhood of Cairo, in January, 1517. . . . Twenty-five thousand Mamluks lay stark upon the field, and the enemy occupied Cairo. There a succession of street-fights took place.” The perfidious Turkish Sultan finally cheated the Mamluks into submission by offering amnesty, and then put them to the sword, giving the city up to massacre. “Tuman Bey, after some further resistance, was captured and executed, and Egypt became a Turkish province. . . . Sultan Selim returned to Constantinople in 1518, a much more dignified personage than he had set out. By the conquest of the Mamluk kingdom he had also succeeded to their authority over the sacred cities of Arabia, Mekka and Medina, and in recognition of this position, as well as of his undoubted supremacy among Mohammedan monarchs, he received from the last Abbaside Khalif, who kept a shadowy court at Cairo, the inheritance of the great pontiffs of Baghdad. The ‘faineant’ Khalif was induced to make over to the real sovereign the spiritual authority which he still affected to exercise, and with it the symbols of his office, the standard and cloak of the Prophet Mohammed. Selim now became not only the visible chief of the Mohammedan State throughout the wide dominions subdued to his sway, but also the revered head of the religion of Islam, wheresoever it was practised in its orthodox form. The heretical Shias of Persia might reject his claim, but in India, in all parts of Asia and Africa, where the traditional Khalifate was recognized, the Ottoman Sultan henceforth was the supreme head of the church, the successor to the spiritual prestige of the long line of the Khalifs. How far this new title commands the homage of the orthodox Moslem world is a matter of dispute; but there can be no doubt that it has always added, and still adds, a real and important authority to the acts and proclamations of the Ottoman Sultan.” Selim died in 1520, and was succeeded by his son Suleyman, or Solyman, who acquired the name of “the Magnificent.”— S. Lane-Poole, Story of Turkey, eh. 8-9.
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Also In: A. de Lamartine. Hist, of Turkey, bk. 15-18 (r. 2).—A. A. Paton, Hut. of the Egyptian Revolution, ch. 5.
A. D. 1498-1502.—War with the Venetians. —”During the first 17 years of Bajazet’s reign, the peace between the Venetians and the Porte, though occasionally menaced, remained on the whole undisturbed. The Venetians complained of the Turkish incursions, and the definitive occupation of Montenegro, while the Porte, on its side, was jealous because the Republic had reduced the Duke of Naxos to dependence, and obtained possession of Cyprus (1489). At last, in 1498, tlie Turks, after making great naval preparations, suddenly arrested all the Venetian residents at Constantinople, and in the following year seized Lepanto, which surrendered without striking a blow (August 1499). Soon after, a body of 10,000 Turks crossed the Isonzo, carrying fire and desolation almost to the lagoons of Venice. In August 1500, Modon was taken by assault. . . . Navarino and Koron surrendered soon after, but towards the close of the year the Venetians were more successful. They captured /Egina, devastated and partly occupied Mytilene, Tenedos, and Samothrace, and with the help of a Spanish squadron, and 7,000 troops, under Gonsalvo de Cordova, reduced the island of Cephalonia. For this service the grateful Venetians rewarded Gonsalvo with a present of 500 tuns of Cretan wine. 60,000 pounds of cheese, 266 pounds of wrought silver, and the honorary freedom of their Republic. In 1501 the Venetian fleet was joined by a French, a Papal, and a Spanish squadron, but, through a want of cordiality among the commanders, little was effected. The Turks, however, had not made a better figure; and the Porte, whose attention was at that time distracted by the affairs of Persia, was evidently inclined for peace. The disordered state of the Venetian finances, and the
decay of their commerce through the maritime discoveries of the Portuguese, also disposed them to negociation; although the sale of indulgences, granted to them by the Pope for this war, is said to have brought more than 700 pounds of gold into their exchequer. The war nevertheless continued through 1502, and the Venetians were tolerably successful, having captured many Turkish ships, and, with the assistance of the French, taken the island of Sta. Maura. But at length a treaty was signed, Dec. 14th, by which Venice was allowed to hold Cephalonia, but restored Sta. Maura, and permitted the Porte to retain its conquests, including the three important fortresses of Modon, Koron, and Navarino.”—T. H. Dyer, Hist, of Modern Europe, bk. 1, eh. 6 (v. 1).
A. D. 1519.—The Sultan acquires sovereignty of Algiers and Tunis. See Barbary States: A. D. 1516-1535.
A. D. 1520.—Accession of Solyman I.
A. D. 1521-1526.—Capture of Belgrade.— Great invasion of Hungary.—Overwhelming victory of Mohacs. See Hungary: A. D. 1487-1526.
A. D. 1522.—Conquest of the isle of Rhodes. —Expulsion of the Knights of St. John. See
Hospitallers Of St. John: A. D. 1522.
A. D. 1526-1567.—The Sultan suzerain of Transylvania and master of Hungary.—Invasion of Austria and siege of Vienna.—Death of Solyman the Magnificent. See Hungary: A. D. 1526-1567.
A. D. 1527.—Final subjugation of the Bosnians. See Balkan And Danubian States: 9-16th Centuries.
A. D. 1532-1553.— Frightful depredations along the coast of Southern Italy. See Italy (southern): A. D. 1528-1570.
A. D. 1542.—Alliance with France.—Siege of Nice.—Ravages on the Italian coast. See France: A. D. 1532-1547.
A. D. 1551-1560.—Unsuccessful attack on Malta.—Capture of Tripoli.—Disastrous attempt of the Christians to recover that city. See Barbary States: A. D. 1543-1560.
A. D. 1565.—Unsuccessful attack on the Knights of St. John in Malta. See HospitalLers Of St. JonN: A. D. 1530-1565.
A. D. 1566-1571.—Reign of Selim II.—War with the Holy League of Spain, Venice and the Pope.—Conquest of Cyprus.—Great defeat at Lepanto.—”In 1566, Solyman the Magnificent closed his long and prosperous reign. His son and successor, Selim II., possessed few of the qualities of his great father. Bred in the Seraglio, he showed the fruits of his education in his indolent way of life, and in the free indulgence of the most licentious appetites. With these effeminate tastes, he inherited the passion for conquest which belonged, not only to his father, but to the whole of his warlike dynasty. . . . The scheme which most occupied the thoughts of Selim was the conquest of Cyprus. . . . Selim, resolved on the acquisition of Cyprus, was not slow in devising a pretext for claiming it from Venice as a part of the Ottoman empire. The republic, though willing to make almost any concession rather than come to a rupture with the colossal power under whose shadow she lay, was not prepared to surrender without a struggle the richest gem in her colonial diadem. War was accordingly declared against her by the Porte, and vast preparations were made for titting out an armament against Cyprus. Venice, in her turn, showed her usual alacrity in providing for the encounter. She strained her resources to the utmost. In a very short time she equipped a powerful fleet, and took measures to place the fortifications of Cyprus in a proper state of defence. But Venice no longer boasted a navy such as in earlier days had enabled her to humble the pride of Genoa, and to ride the unquestioned mistress of the Mediterranean. The defences of her colonies, moreover, during her long repose had gradually fallen into decay. In her extremity, she turned to the Christian powers of Europe, and besought them to make common cause with her against the enemy of Christendom.” The only responses to her appeal came, first, from Pope Pius V., and finally, through his urgency, from Philip II. of Spain. After much deliberation, Philip agreed, in the spring of 1570, to enter into an alliance with Venice and the Pope against the Ottoman Porte. “The ensuing summer, the royal admiral, the famous John Andrew Doria, who was lying with a strong squadron off Sicily, put to sea, by the king’s orders. He was soon after reinforced by a few galleys which were furnished by his holiness, and placed under the command of Mark Antonio Colonna. . . . On the last of August, 1570, the combined fleet effected its junction with the Venetians at Candia, and a plan of operations was immediately arranged. It was not long before the startling intelligence arrived that Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus, had been taken and sacked by the Turks, with all the circumstances of cruelty which distinguish wars in which the feeling of national hostility is embittered by religious hatred. The plan was now to be changed. A dispute arose among the commanders as to the course to be pursued. No one had authority enough to enforce compliance with his own opinion. The dispute ended in a rupture. The expedition was abandoned. . . . Still the stouthearted pontiff was not discouraged;” nor did the king of Spain draw back. “Venice, on the other hand, soon showed that the Catholic king had good reason for distrusting her fidelity. Appalled by the loss of Nicosia, with her usual inconstancy, she despatched a secret agent to Constantinople, to see if some terms might not yet be made with the sultan.” Her overtures, however, were coldly received by the sultan, and she was won back to the alliance. “Towards the close of 1570, the deputies from the three powers met in Rome to arrange the terms of the league.” With much difficulty, a treaty was concluded, and ratified in May, 1571, to the effect that the operations of the league ” should be directed against the Moors of Tunis, Tripoli, and Algiers, as well as against the Turks; that the contracting parties should furnish 200 galleys, 100 transports and smaller vessels, 50,000 foot and 4,500 horse, with the requisite artillery and munitions; that by April, at farthest, of every succeeding year, a similar force should be held in readiness by the allies for expeditions to the Levant; and that any year in which there was no expedition in common, and either Spain or tiie republic should desire to engage in one on her own account against the infidel, the other confederates should furnish 50 galleys towards it; that if the enemy should invade the dominions of any of the three powers, the others should be bound to come to the aid of their ally;
that three-sixths of the expenses of the war should be borne by the Catholic king, two-sixths by the republic, the remaining sixth by the Holy See; . . . that each power should appoint a captaingeneral; that the united voices of the three commanders should regulate the plan of operations; that the execution of this plan should be intrusted to the captain-general of the league, and that this high office should be given to Don John of Austria [natural son of Charles V. and half-brother of Philip II.]. . . . Such were the principal provisions of the famous treaty of the Holy League.” The sultan was not dismayed. “He soon got together a powerful fleet, partly drawn from his own dominions, and in part from those of the Moslem powers on the Mediterranean, who acknowledged allegiance to the Porte. The armada was placed under the command of Selim’s brother-in-law, the Pacha Piali. . . . Early in the season [of 1571] the combined fleets sailed for the Adriatic, and Piali, after landing and laying waste the territory belonging to the republic, detached Uluch [dey of Algiers] with his squadron to penetrate higher up the gulf. The Algerine, in executing these orders, advanced so near to Venice as to throw the inhabitants of that capital into . . . consternation. . . . Meanwhile the Venetians were pushing forward their own preparations with their wonted alacrity,— indeed with more alacrity than thoroughness. . . . The fleet was placed under the command of Sebastian Veniero,” and sailed before midsummer, “or as much of it as was then ready, for the port of Messina, appointed as the place of rendezvous for the allies. Here he was soon joined by Colonna, the papal commander, with the little squadron furnished by his holiness; and the two fleets lay at anchor . . . waiting the arrival of the rest of the confederates and of Don John of Austria.” The latter reached Messina on the 25th of August. “The whole number of vessels in the armada, great and small, amounted to something more than 300. Of these full two thirds were ‘royal galleys.’ Venice alone contributed 106, besides six ‘galeazzas.’ These were ships of enormous bulk. . . . The number of persons on board of the fleet, soldiers and seamen, was estimated at 80,000. . . . The soldiers did not exceed 29,000. … On the 16th of September the magnificent armament . . . stood out to sea.” Before encountering the Turkish fleet, the allies received tidings “that Famagosta, the second city of Cyprus, had fallen into the hands of the enemy, and this under circumstances of unparalleled perfidy and cruelty. . . . The fall of Famagosta secured the fall of Cyprus, which thus became permanently incorporated in the Ottoman empire.” On Sunday, October 7th, the armada of the Turks was found and attacked in the gulf of Lepanto. The terrific fight which ensued lasted only four hours, but those were hours of indescribable destruction and carnage. “It was indeed a sanguinary battle, surpassing in this particular any sea-fight of modern times. The loss fell much the most heavily on the Turks. There is the usual discrepancy about numbers; but it may be safe to estimate their loss at nearly 25,000″ slaiu and 5,000 prisoners. What brought most pleasure to the hearts of the conquerors was the liberation of 12,000 Christian captives, who had been chained to the oar on board the Moslem galleys, and who now came forth, with tears of joy streaming down their
haggard cheeks, to bless their deliverers. The loss of the allies was comparatively small,— less than 8,000.” As to the armada of the Turks, “it may almost be said to have been annihilated. Not more than 40 galleys escaped out of near 250 which entered into the action. . . . The news of the victory of Lepanto caused a profound sensation throughout Christendom. . . . In Venice, which might be said to have gained a new lease of existence from the result of the battle, . . . the 7th of October was set apart to be observed for ever as a national anniversary. . . . It is a great error to speak of the victory of Lepanto as a barren victory, which yielded no fruits to those who gained it. True, it did not strip the Turks of an inch of territory. . . . But the loss of reputation — that tower of strength to the conqueror — was not to be estimated.”—W. H. Prescott, Hist, of Philip II, bk. 5, eh. 9-11.
Also In: Sir W. Stirling-Maxwell, Hon John of Austria, n. 1. eh. 13-15.
A. D. 1569-1570.—First collision with the Russians.—Vizir Sokolli’s canal project and its frustration.—Peace with the Czar. See Russia: A. D. 1569-1571.
A. D. 1572-1573. — Withdrawal of Venice from the Holy League.— Conquest of Tunis by Don John of Austria and its recovery, with Goletta.—” Ulucciali, whom Seliin . . . made commander-in-chief of all his naval forces, exerted himself with extraordinary vigour and activity in fitting out a new fleet, to supply the place of that which had been ruined in the battle of Lepanto; and such at this time were the resources of the Turkish empire, that he was ready by the month of April [1572] to leave Constantinople, with more than 200 galleys, besides a great number of other ships. With this fleet he coasted along Negropont, the Morea, and Epirus; put the maritime towns into a posture of defence; chastised with great severity many of those Christians who had been concerned in the invitation given to Don John [who had just been offered the sovereignty of Albania and Macedonia by the Christians of those countries]; and afterwards took his station at Motion in the Morea, with an intention to watch there the motions of the enemy. He had full leisure to finish all the preparations which he judged to be necessary. The allies disputed long with one another concerning the plan of their future operations,” and were also held inactive by the Spanish king’s fear of an attack from France. ” It was the last day of August before the allies could effectuate a junction of their forces; and it was the middle of September before they came in sight of the enemy. . . . Ulucciali drew out his fleet, as if he intended to offer battle; but no sooner had he made a single discharge of his artillery . . . than he retired under the fortifications of Modon.” The allies thought first of besieging Modon, but gave up the project. They then sent Alexander Famese, prince of Parma — afterwards so famous in the Netherlands — to reduce Navarino; but he had no success and abandoned the siege. The expedition then returned to Messina. The Venetians, dissatisfied with the conduct of the war, now faithlessly negotiated a separate peace with the Turks; but Philip II. of Spain maintained his alliance with the Pope (now Gregory XIII.), and ordered his brother, Don John, to proceed the
next spring to Africa and undertake the reduction of Tunis. Don John obeyed the order, “carrying with him for this purpose a fleet of 2,000 sail, having 20,000 foot on board, besides 400 light horse, 700 pioneers, and a numerous train of heavy artillery. Tunis was at this time in the hands of the Turks, commanded by Heder Basha, whom Selim had lately sent to govern the town and kingdom. Heder, seized with consternation at the approach of the Spanish fleet, left Tunis with his troops and a great number of the inliabitants, and Don John took possession of the place without meeting with the smallest opposition. Philip had instructed his brother, when he sent him on this expedition, to destroy Tunis, and to strengthen the fortifications of the isle and fortress of Goletta. But instead of complying with these instructions, Don John resolved to fortify the town more strongly than ever; and having laid the foundations of a new fort, or citadel, he treated all the inhabitants who remained with lenity and indulgence; and engaged many of those who had fled to return and submit to the Spanish government; after which he carried back his fleet to Sicily.” It is believed that Don John had conceived ambitious hopes of a kingdom on the African border of the Mediterranean. “In the summer following [1573], Selim sent Ulucciali against Tunis, with a fleet consisting of 300 ships, having about 40,000 troops on board, under the command of his sonin-law, Sinan Basha. The new fort which Don John had begun to build was not yet complete. Nor was the garrison which he had left strong enough to hold out long against so great a force.” Before Don John could reassemble a fleet with which to make his way to the protection of his African conquest, both Tunis and Goletta were carried by assault, and passed again into the possession of the Turks and their Moorish vassals. — R. Watson, Hist, of Philip II, bk. 9.
Also In: Sir W. Stirling-Maxwell, -Don John of Austria, v. 2, eh. 1-3.
A. D. 1572-1623.— Beginning of the decline of the Ottoman power.—”The conquest of Cyprus was the last great exploit which ever added materially to the dominions of the Porte; the battle of Lepanto was the final blow which destroyed its naval superiority. The days of greatness had gone by. The kingdoms of the West were developing their strength, and had learnt the policy of union and of peace among themselves. Their armies had acquired the discipline and had learnt the lessons in which the Ottomans had shown so formidable an example; and their navy rode triumphant on the seas. The Empire, no longer iu the hands of Charles V., with foreign interests to absorb its power, could bestow an undivided strength upon its own affairs; and the Emperor Ferdinand was looking forward with some hope to an incorporation of Hungary, which should end the weakness, and ensure the safety, of his eastern frontier. As the pre-eminence of the Porte, however, and the dread of it declined, a wider intercourse for her with Europe began. . . . Slowly the Sultans were beginning to take part in the schemes and combinations of the Christian Powers, from which they had hitherto so contemptuously stood aloof. Five reigns succeeded to that of Selim [the Sot, son of Solyman the Magnificent], during which the progress of decline continued marked. The indolence of Amurath III. [15741595], the incapacity of Mahomet III. [15951603], the inexperience of Achmet I. [1603-1617], the imprudence of Othman II. [1618-1622], and the imbecility of Mustapha [1617-1618, and 1622-1623], contributed to bring the Ottoman Empire into a condition of anarchy and weakness. During the reign of Amurath hostilities with Austria were renewed, and successive losses testified to the enfeebled state of the Ottoman arms.”—C. F. Johnstone, Historical Abstracts, ch. 3.
Bagdad.
A. D. 1591-1606. — Wars in Hungary and Croatia.—Great victory at Cerestes.—Peace of Sitvatorok. See Hungary: A. D. 1567-1604; and 1595-1606.
A. D. 1621-1622.—War with Poland.—Victory at Cecora and defeat at Choczim. See Poland: A. D. 1590-1648.
A. D. 1623-1640.—War with Persia.—Siege and capture of Bagdad.—Horrible massacre of the inhabitants.—”During the first twelve years of the reign of Amurath IV. [1623-1635], the Ottoman Empire had been occupied with active hostilities in different parts of Europe, and especially with Poland, Germany, and the maritime powers of the Mediterranean. … In the east, however, great losses had been sustained. Shah Abbas, a sovereign well entitled to the epithet ‘Great,’ had repossessed himself of Diarbekr, Baghdad [1623], the district of the Euphrates, with Kourdistan; and, on the north, he had regained Armenia, and a considerable part of Anatolia. The Sultan therefore resolved to undertake an expedition to recover the territories thus taken from him, and to this he was encouraged by the death of his formidable foe the Persian monarch. Amurath marched from his capital early in 1635, to superintend the operations of the campaign. … In passing through Asia, he took care personally to examine into the conduct of his various Pashas, and wherever it was requisite lie subjected them to a severe punishment. One of them, the Pasha of Erzeroum, was put to death. Having at that city reviewed his army, he found them to amount to 200,000 men, and as his first object was the seizure of Armenia, the key of the Persian provinces, he besieged Erivan, and notwithstanding a vigorous defence, the fortress in a few days surrendered. Tauris and the surrounding provinces speedily fell into his hands, and Amurath returned in the winter to Constantinople, entering the city in great triumph. The affairs of Europe were in such a state of confusion, that it was several years ere he again appeared in the east, the scene of so many of his victories. The Khan of Tartary threw off his allegiance, the Polish serfs appeared suddenly on the Caspian shores, and, joining a body of Russians, attacked and carried the fortress of Azof. . . . The European war, which at this time occurred, rendered it unnecessary for the Sultan to entertain ‘any serious apprehension from his enemies in the west, who were sufficiently occupied with their own affairs. He therefore directed his attention to Persia, resolved to subjugate that country, and to seize upon Baghdad. To this end his preparations were proportionally great. An immense army was collected on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus. This mighty host numbered more than 300,000 armed men, and was accompanied by a numerous array of miners, as well as artillery. And after having consulted an astrologer, Amu
rath embarked amid all the display which Asiatic pomp could furnish, and directed his progress toward Persia. After a successful march, this immense army arrived at Baghdad. The city was strongly fortified, and defended by a resolute army of 80,000 men. The Shah, however, was absent in the northern part of his dominions, which had been threatened by an invasion from India, under Shah Jehan, father of the celebrated Aurungzebe. Baghdad, therefore, was left to its own resources. The operations of the siege began in October 1638. . . . The besieged made repeated sallies, with a force of five or six thousand men at a time, who, on retiring, were succeeded by a similar number, and thus the losses of the Ottoman army were sometimes very great. The 200 great guns, however, which played upon the ramparts, at length made a wide opening in the walls, and after five days’ fighting in the breach thus made, where ‘the slain lay in immense multitudes, and the blood was stagnated like a pool to wade through,’ the city was taken. Quarter was given to 24,000 of the defenders, who remained alive, on condition that they would lay down their arms. But as soon as they mid done so, the Sultan perfidiously issued orders to the Janizaries, and the work of butchery commenced, and was carried on by torch-light during the night on which the city was taken, and an indiscriminate slaughter took place, neither youth, nor age, nor sex being spared by the ruthless conqueror and his merciless soldiers. . . . In the morning of the 23d of December the Sultan marched into the city, passing with his army over the innumerable bodies of the unfortunate Persians, whose gallant defence merited a better fate. Some 15,000 women, children and old men were all that remained of the inhabitants, who, but a day or two before, filled every part of the magnificent capital. . . . The capture of Baghdad closed the military career of the Sultan.”—R. W. Fraser, Turkey, Ancient and Modern, ch. 17.—”A peace with Persia, on the basis of that which Solyman the Great had granted irt 1555, was the speedy result of Amurath’s victories (15th September, 1639). Eriwan was restored by the Porte; but the possession of Bagdad and the adjacent territory by the Ottomans was solemnly sanctioned and confirmed. Eighty years passed away before Turkey was again obliged to struggle against her old and obstinate enemy 011 the line of the Euphrates. . . . Amurath died at the age of 28, on the 9th of February, 1640.”—Sir E. S. Creasy, Hist, of the Ottoman Turks, ch. 13.
A. D. 1625-1626.—War in Hungary. See Hungary: A. D. 1606-1660.
A. D. 1640.—Accession of Ibrahim.
A. D. 1645-1669. — The war of Candia.— Conquest of Crete.—” The Turks attacked the island [of Crete] in 1645, and the war went on till 1669, when Crete was lost. This is called the war of Candia, from the long siege of the town of Candia, which was most gallantly defended by the Venetians, with the help of many volunteers from Western Europe. It must be remembered that, though the island has sometimes got to be called Candia, from the town of Candia and its memorable siege, yet the island itself has never changed its name, but has always been called Crete both by Greeks and Turks.”—E. A. Freeman, The Ottoman Power in Europe, p. 145. —”The war which cost the republic of Venice the island of Crete owed its origin to the incessant irritation caused by the Western corsairs in the Archipelago. Some strong measures adopted by the Venetians to suppress the piracies committed by Turkish and Barbary corsairs in the Adriatic, created much dissatisfaction on the part of the Othomnn government, which looked chiefly to the Mohammedan corsairs as a protection against the Christian corsairs in the Levant, and considered it the duty of the Venetians to suppress the piracies of these Christians. The Porte at last resolved to seek a profitable revenge, and a pretext soon presented itself. In 1644 some Maltese galleys made a prize which offended the personal feelings of the reigning sultan, Ibrahim. … As he feared to attack Malta, he resolved to make the Venetians responsible for the shelter which Crete had afforded to the corsairs. The Porte affected to consider Venice as a tributary State, which was bound to keep the Archipelago free from Christian corsairs, in return for the great commercial privileges it enjoyed in the Othoman empire. Immediate preparations were made for attacking Crete, but the project was concealed from the Venetian senate, under the pretence of directing the expedition against Malta. … In the month of June 1645, the Othoman army landed before Canea, which capitulated on the 17th of August. This treacherous commencement of the war authorised the Christian powers to dispense with all the formalities of international law in lending assistance to the Venetians during the celebrated War of Candia, which lasted nearly 25 years. During this long struggle the Venetians generally maintained the superiority at sea, but they were unable to prevent the Othoman navy, whenever it exerted its full force, from throwing in supplies of fresh troops and ample stores, by which the Othoman army was enabled to command the whole island, and kept Candia, and the other fortresses in the hands of the republic, either blockaded or besieged. The Greeks generally favoured the Turks, who encouraged them to cultivate their lands by purchasing the produce iit a liberal price, for the use of the army. . . . The squadrons of the republic often ravaged the coasts of the Othoman empire, and on one occasion they carried off about 5,000 slaves from the <oast of the Morea, between Patras and Coron. In the year 1656, after Mocenigo’s great victory at the Dardanelles, they took possession of the islands of Tenedos and Lemnos, but they were driven from these conquests by the Othoman fleet in the following year. At the end of the year 1666, the grand vizier, Achmet Kueprily, one of the greatest ministers of the Othoman empire, took the command of the siege of Candia. The whole naval force of Venice, and numerous bands of French and Italian volunteers, attempted to force the grand vizier to raise the siege; but the skill of the Italian engineers, the valour of the French nobles, and the determined perseverance of Morosini, were vain against the strict discipline and steady valour of the Othoman troops. The works of the besiegers were pushed forward by the labours of a numerous body of Greek pioneers, and the fire of the powerful batteries at last rendered the place untenable. At this crisis Morosini proved himself a daring statesman and a sincere patriot. When he found that he must surrender the city, he re
solved to make his capitulation the means of purchasing peace for the republic. … On the 27th September 1669, Achmet Kueprily received the keys of Candia, and the republic of Venice resigned all right to the island of Crete, but retained possession of the three insular fortresses of Karabusa, Suda, and Spinalonga, with their valuable ports. No fortress is said to have cost so much blood and treasure, both to the besiegers and the defenders, as Candia; yet the Greeks, in whose territory it was situated, and who could have furnished an army from the inhabitants of Crete sufficiently numerous to have decided the issue of the contest, were the people on the shores of the Mediterranean who took least part in this memorable war. So utterly destitute of all national feeling was the Hellenic race at this period.”—G. Finlay, Hist, of Greece under Othoman and Venetian Domination, ch. 2.
A. D. 1649.—Accession of Mohammed IV.
A. D. 1660-1664.—Renewed war with Austria.—Defeat at St. Gothard.—A twenty years truce. See Hungary: A. D. 1660-1664.
A. D. 1664-1665. — Alliance with France broken.—War of the French with Tunis and Algiers. See Barbary States: A. D. 16641681.
A. D. 1670-1676.—Wars with the Poles.
See Poland: A. D. 1668-1696.
A. D. 1681-1684.— Rupture with France.— French attack on Scio and war with the Barbary States. See Barbary States: A. D. 1664-1684.
A. D. 1683.—Great invasion of Austria.— Siege of Vienna.—Overwhelming defeat by Sobieski and the Imperialists. See Hungary: A. D. 1668-1683.
A. D. 1683-1699.—Expulsion from Hungary. —The Peace of Carlowitz. See Hungary: A. D. 1683-1699.
A. D. 1684-1696.— War with the Holy League.—Expulsion from Hungary.— Venetian conquests in Greece.—Revolution at Constantinople.—Accession of Solyman II.—Czar Peter’s capture of Azov.—The first Russian acquisition on the Black Sea.—In 1684, “a league against the Turks, under the protection of the Pope, and thence called the Holy League, was formed by the Emperor, the King of Poland, and the Republic of Venice; and it was resolved to procure, if possible, the accession to it of the Czar of Muscovy. The Venetians were induced to join the league by the hope of recovering their former possessions, and declared war against the Sultan, Mahomet IV., July 15th. The war which ensued, now called the Holy War. lasted till the Peace of Carlowicz in 1699. Venice in this war put forth a strength that was little expected from that declining state. Many thousand Germans were enrolled in her army, commanded by Morosini, and by Count Konigsmark, a Swede. The Austrians pursued the campaign in Hungary with success [steadily expelling the Turks— see Hungary: A. D. 168316’J’J]. . . . While the war in Hungary had been conducted by the Emperor with such eminent success, the King of Poland had made only some fruitless attempts upon Moldavia. The Czar of .Muscovy, Ivan Alexiowitsch, who, after settling some disputes about boundaries with the King of Poland, had joined the Holy League in 1686, did not fare much better. ■ All the attempts of the Russians to penetrate into the Crimea were frustrated by the Tartars. The Venetians, on the other hand, had made some splendid conquests. St Maura, Koron, the mountain tract of Maina, Navarino, Modon, Argos, Napoli di Romania, fell successively into their hands. The year 1687 especially was almost as fatal to the Turks in their war with Venice as in that with Hungary. In this year the Venetians took Patras, the castles at the entrance of the bay of Lepanto, Lepanto itself, all the northern coast of the Morea, Corinth, and Athens. Athens had been abandoned with the exception of the acropolis or citadel; and it was in this siege that one of the Venetian bombs fell into the Parthenon, which had been converted by the Turks into a powder magazine, and destroyed the greater part of those magnificent remains of classical antiquity. The acropolis surrendered September 29th. The fall of Athens, added to the disastrous news from Hungary, excited the greatest consternation and discontent at Constantinople,” and brought about a revolution which deposed the sultan, raising his brother Solyman to the throne (1687) in his place. “By the capture of Malvasia in 1690, the Venetians completed the conquest of the Morea. The Isle of Chios, taken in 1694, was again lost the following year; but in Dalmatia and Albania the Venetian Republic made many permanent conquests, from the mountains of Montenegro to the borders of Croatia and the banks of the Unna. The operations of the Poles in the Turkish war were insignificant; but in July 1696, the Russians, under the Czar Peter, after many long and fruitless attempts, at length succeeded in taking Azov, at the mouth of the Don; a most important conquest as securing for them the entry into the Black Sea. It was the fall of this place, combined with the defeat at Zenta [in Hungary], that chiefly induced the Porte to enter into negotiation for a peace.”—T. H. Dyer, Hist, of Modern Europe, bk. 5, ch. 4 (t. 8).
the Morea.
A. D. 1691.—Accession of Achmet II.
A. D. 1695.—Accession of Mustapha II.
A. D. 1703.—Accession of Achmet III.
A. D. 1709-1714.—Refuge given to Charles XII. of Sweden.—His intrigues.—Unlucky invasion of Moldavia by Peter the Great.—The Treaty of the Pruth. See Scandinavian States (sweden): A. D. 1707-1718.
A. D. 1714-1718. — War with Venice and Austria. — Recovery of the Morea and disasters in Hungary.—The Peace of Passarowitz.—”By the treaty of the Pruth the Russian conquest of Azof had been recovered. This success encouraged the hope of repairing the other losses that had been incurred in the former war. There were two states which had aggrandised themselves at Turkish expense, Austria and Venice. Of these the republic was far the less formidable and was naturally chosen as the first object of attack. A pretext was found in the protection which Venice had given to some Montenegrin fugitives, and in December, 1714, the Porte declared war. Venice was entirely unprepared, and moreover had failed to acquire popularity amongst her Greek subjects. In 1715, the “grand vizier, Ali Cumurgi, landed in the Morea, and by the end of the year was master of the whole peninsula. Sailing thence he captured Suda and Spinalonga, the two last fortresses that Venice had been allowed to retain in Crete. The republic naturally appealed to
her old ally, Austria, which had guaranteed her possessions by the treaty of Carlowitz. … As the Turk refused to give any satisfaction, war was inevitable. The intervention of Austria saved Venice from ruin. The grand vizier and the main body of the Turkish army had to be employed in Hungary. Still a considerable army and fleet was sent to attack Corfu. The Venetian troops were commanded by count Schulenburg, who had won a great reputation in the northern war, and whose services had been procured for the republic by Eugene. A heroic defence ended successfully, and in August, 1716. the Turks were compelled to raise the siege. ‘It was the last glorious military exploit in the annals of the republic, and it was achieved by a German mercenary soldier.’ Meanwhile the vizier, with an army of 150.000 men, had laid siege to Pcterwardein, the most important of the Austrian border-fortresses in Hungary,” and suffered death there, in a great defeat which prince Eugene inflicted upon his army, August 5, 1716. The same year, Eugene took Temesvar, and in August, 1717, he annihilated the Turkish army before Belgrad, capturing the town (see HinGaky: A. D. 1699-1718). The result was the Treaty of Passarowitz, signed in July, 1718. “Austria retained all its conquests, thus completing its possession of Hungary by acquiring the Banat of Temesvar, and adding to it Belgrad and a strip of Servia. The Turks, on their side, kept the Morea, while Venice was confirmed in its possession of Corfu and Santa Maura, together with the conquests which it had made in 1717 in Albania and Dalmatia.”—R. Lodge, Hist, of Modern Europe, ch. 16.
A. D. 1730.— Accession of Mahmoud I.
A. D. 1735-1739.— War with Russia and Austria.— Favourable Treaty of BelgradeImportant acquisitions of Territory from Austria. See Russia: A. D. 1725-1739.
A. D. 1754.—Accession of Othman III.
A. D. 1757.—Accession of Mustapha III.
A. D. 1768-1774.—War with Russia on behalf of Poland.— Concession of independence to the Crim Tartars.—The Poles, in their struggle with Catherine II. of Russia found a strange champion in the Turk (see Poland: A. D. 17631773). “The Sultan, Mustafa III., wasopposed to intervention in Poland; but his hand was forced by a rising in Constantinople, and he declared war against Russia in October, 1768. Hostilities were not commenced till the next year, and they never assumed considerable proportions. The Turkish army was in the last, stage of inefficiency, and the Russians, who were wholly unprepared for war, were little better. Galitzin, an incompetent commander, defeated the grand vizier, and took Khoczim after his first attack had been repulsed. His successor, Romanzow, ‘the Russian Turenne,’ acted with greater energy. He drove the Turks from Moldavia, and in 1770 he occupied Wallachia, won a great victory over vastly superior numbers at Kaghul [August 1, 1770], and advanced into the Crimea. At the same time a Russian fleet appeared in the Mediterranean with the avowed intention of restoring Greece to independence. But the admiral, Alexis Orloff, mismanaged the expedition. After encouraging the Greeks to rebel, he left them to the horrors of a Turkish revenge, and sailed towards Constantinople. A victory over the Turkish fleet gave him possession of Chios and other islands of the Archipelago, but he refused, in spite of his English officers, to attempt the passage of the Dardanelles.” In May, 1772, a truce was arranged and a congress assembled to settle the terms of peace. “But the Russian demands were too excessive for the Porte to accept, and the Turks resumed hostilities in 1773. They attempted to recover Moldavia and Wallachia. and for a time they succeeded in forcing the Russians to retreat. Mustafa III. died in December, and was succeeded by his brother Abdul Humid. In the next year Romanzow won a complete victory, and compelled the grand vizier to accept the terms dictated to him at Kutschuk Kainardji [July 16, 1774]. The Russians restored the conquered provinces except Azof and Kinburn, only stipulating for toleration for the Christian population. The Tartars of the Crimea and Kuban were declared independent of the Porte, and authorised to elect their own Khan. Russian ships were allowed free passage through the Dardanelles, and the right of sailing in .the Turkish seas and on the Danube. Poland, for which the Turks had undertaken the war, was not even mentioned in the treaty.”—R. Lodge, Hint, of Modem Europe, ch. 20, sect. 11-12.
R}issia and Austria.
Also Is: F. C. Schlosser, Hint, of tlie \%th Century, v. 4, pp. 405-441.— Sec, also, Russia: A. D. 1762-1796.
A. D. 1774.— Accession of Abdul Hamid.
A. D. 1770-1792.—Acquisition of the Crimea by the Russians.—War with Russia and Austria.—The Treaties of Sistova and Jassy.— Territorial concessions.—” A peace of some years followed the treaty of Kainarji, if, indeed, that can be called peace where the most solemn engagements are perpetually evaded. On that treaty Catherine put what interpretation she pleased. . . . She offered her protection to the voivods of Wallachia and Moldavia, who, in consequence, were her vassals rather than those of the Porte. The Christians on the opposite bank of the Danube were in correspondence with Russia; they were encouraged to revolt, to claim her-protection, to oppose the Turkish government in every way. . . . Though the Crimea had been declared independent, she proved that the word had reference merely to the authority of the sultan, and not to hers. . . . More than once . . . the Russian troops appeared in that peninsula. In 1776 they deposed the reigning khan, and elected in his stead another, who was easily induced to solicit the protection of the empress. Turkey threatened to resume the war. … At length … a new treaty, or rather a modification of the former, was signed at Constantinople in 1779. In it Russia promised to desist from some of her obnoxious pretensions in regard both to the two principalities and the Crimea; but promises cost little. . . . Almost every year brought new complaints and evasions. The foundation of the city of Cherson, about ten leagues from Otzakof, gave peculiar umbrage to the Porte. This place had now a population of 40,000; and the number of warlike vessels constructed in its arsenal were evidently intended to overawe Constantinople. In 1783 another insulting message was sent to the Turkish ministers,— that, let the conduct of the empress in regard to the Crimea be whatever it might, they should not interfere. At the same time she prevailed on the khan whom she had supported,
Sahim Gherei, to make the most outrageous demauds from the Porte. The khan’s envoy was beheaded. Under the pretext of punishing the Turks for this insult to their ‘good ally.’the Russians requested permission to march through his territory. It was immediately granted; but no sooner were they in the peninsula than, instead of proceeding against the Turkish fortifications on the island of Taman, they seized the towns, forced the Mahometan authorities, in the khan’s presence, to take the oath of allegiance to the empress, and seized on the revenues of the country. . . . The khan was now forced to resign his authority, and transfer it to Catherine; in return, he received some estates in Russia. A manifesto declared that the Crimea, Kuban, and Taman. were for ever incorporated with the empire. In a document of some length, and of great force, the Turkish ministry exposed to the world the unprincipled encroachments of their neighbours.” But Russia responded to it by marshalling three great armies on the frontiers, with an exhibition of formidable fleets in the Euxine and the Baltic. “The Porte, terrified at this menacing display, listened to the advice of France and Austria; and, by another treaty (signed at Constantinople early in 1784) recognised the sovereignty of the empress over the Crimea, Taman, and a great part of Kuban. To the first and last of these places she restored their ancient classical names, Taurida and Caucasus.” The treaty of Constantinople did not put an end to Russian aggressions, and in August, 1787, the Sultan declared war. “The campaign was opened with ardour. Knowing that Otzakof would be the earliest object of hostility, the Sultan sent a considerable force to cover it. Another army marched to the Danube, and the vizier in person took the field. … On the other hand, Potemkin, the commander-in-chief, having under his orders some of the best generals in the service, hastened to the frontiers, which were soon covered by Russian troops. At the same time the emperor Joseph [according to a prior agreement with Catherine] sent 80,000 Austrians into Moldavia; while a powerful fleet in the Euxine prepared to co-operate with the allies, and another in the Baltic was ready to sail for the Mediterranean. It seemed, indeed, as if Catherine’s favourite dream, the elevation of her grandson Constantine to the throne of the Greek empire, was about to be realised. Yet these mighty preparations had no commensurate effect. A11 attack on Kinburn by 5,000 Turks from the garrison of Otzakof was repulsed [by Suwarof] with heavy loss. But this advantage was counterbalanced bv the dispersion of the Euxine fleet in a storm, with the loss of some vessels. These were the chief events of the first campaign. The second, of 1788, was more decisive. Otzakof was taken by assault, and the garrison [with nearly all the inhabitants] put to the sword. At the same time Joseph took Sobach; and his generals captured Soubitza [Dubitza ?]. On the deep, too. fortune was equally adverse to the Turks. Their fleet was defeated in the Euxine. … In the following campaigns the superiority of the Russians was maintained. It would have been still more signal hut for the jealousy of Potemkin. who could not tolerate success in any of his generals. . . . The death of Abdul Hamet, and the accession of Selim III., made no difference in the character of the war; it was still
of Selim III.
adverse to the Turks. Fortress after fortress [including Belgrade, taken by General Loudon for the Austrians] was reduced by the enemy; and, though no general engagement was risked, the loss of men was not the less felt. Suwarof saved the Austrians [in Moldavia, defeating the Turks, who had nearly overwhelmed them, at Fockshani, July 30, and again at Rimnik, September 16, 1789]; Repnin forced the Seraskier, Hussein Pasha, to seek refuge in Ismail; Komenski reduced Galatza; Ackerman fell into the power of the Christians; Bender was forced to capitulate. In the following campaign, the important fortress of Ismail was assailed: the siege was conducted by Suwarof, the most dreaded of all the Russian generals. . . . It was taken . . . though the loss was most severe; and, in revenge, the ■unison, with the greater part of the population [nearly 40,000 in all], was put to the sword. Other successes followed, both on the banks of the Caspian, and on those of the Danube. Bohada was stormed; at Kotzim 100,000 Turks were defeated by Repnin; Varna was menaced; and the road to Adrianople lay open. The grand vizier now sued for peace, which Catherine was ready to grant, on conditions much less onerous than might have been expected.” Austria had already made peace with the sultan and withdrawn from the war. By the treaty of Sistova, which the new emperor, Leopold, signed on the 4th of August, 1791, the Austrians relinquished all their conquests except the town of Old Orsova and a small district in Croatia along the left bank of the river Unna. With these slight variations the same boundary between Austria and Turkey was reconstituted in 1791 that had been defined by the treaty of Belgrade in 1739. The treaty of the Turks with Russia was signed at Jassy on the 9th of January 1792. “By that treaty, Catherine retained the whole country between the Bog and the Dniester, but restored all the other conquests which she had made since 1787. This was the last of the hostilities between Russia and the Porte during the reign of this empress; and the peace of Jassy enabled her to carry into effect her designs on Poland.”—R. Bell, Hint, of Russia, v. 2, ch. 11.
Also In: Sir E. S. Creasy, Hist, of the Ottoman Turks, ch. 21.—F. C. Schlosser, Hist, of the 18<A Century, period 5, div. 1, ch. 2 (o. 6). —G. B. Malleson, Ijoudon, ch. 15.
A. D. 1789-1812.—Attempted reforms of Sultan Selim III.—Their fate and his.— Palace revolutions. — Reign of Mahmud II.— War with Russia.—” Abd-ul-Hamid died on the 7th April, 1789, and was succeeded by his naphew, Selim III (1789-1807). Although Selim had been confined in the Seraglio by his uncle, he had been in other respects well treated. His love of information and his natural talents had induced him to carry on an active correspondence with several servants of his father and his uncle. Their information had, however, in no way satisfied him, and he had commenced a correspondence with Choiseuil, the French envoy at Constantinople in 1786, and had also sent his intimate friend Isaac Bey to France, to enquire into the state measures and administrative organization of that country. Selim had also entered into correspondence with Louis XVI, and this lasted till 178’J, when the French Revolution broke out simultaneously with Selim’s ascension of the throne. All this throws a clear light upon
Selim’s eventual exertions to cause reforms, which at last cost him both his throne and his life. His thirst for knowledge leads us to presume that he was not deficient in natural and sound talent. . . . But it was a mistake, that in his pursuit of knowledge, and desire to improve the institutions of Turkey — and the habits and character of its inhabitants — Selim should have applied to France, and to Frenchmen. That country was then on the eve of her great revolution. Theories of all kinds were afloat. . . . Selim would certainly have acted more wisely had he sought help from his own sensible mind; he would have easily perceived the palpable fact, that things which were suited for Christian nations were utterly inapplicable to the rude, uncivilized Turks. . . . Unfortunately he set about the task with very different ideas, and listened to the suggestions of the sciolists who surrounded him. The first thing to which they drew his attention was the formation of a council of state, which not only restricted the power of the Grand Vizier, but that of the Sultan, very materially. The Reis Effendi, Raschid, was the soul of the council, and the boldest of these sciolists; and he had perfect liberty to carry on the work of reform. He set the printing presses again in activity which had been introduced in a preceding reign, sent for French officers, who founded an engineer academy, built arsenals and foundries, and openlv stated that he took science under his protection. But his chief care was to form an army after the European fashion, in order by their assistance to gain the mastery over the Janissaries, in whom old customs and traditions found their most zealous guardians. He took several steps, therefore, to call into life the new- military organization, called the Nizam Djedid; and as money was required for the purpose, he laid a tax on articles of consumption. This was quite sufficient to cause the popular discontent to burst into a flame. The Ulema declared themselves hostile to the Nizam Djedid, and Pashwan Oglu, Pacha of Widdin, who placed himself at the head of the Janissaries, openly rebelled against the Porte, which could not effect anything to check him, but acquiesced in all that was demanded. The extraordinary conquests of Napoleon diverted attention from Turkey, and instead of seeking to divide the dominions of a weak neighbour, the Great Powers of the Continent were trembling for their own safety. Egypt became the battle field between England and France [see Fhance: A. D. 1798-1799 (august—Accost), and 1801-1803], “and its invasion by Napoleon obliged the Turks to unite with the Allied Powers against France. When the French were expelled from Egypt, that province was restored to Turkey, and peace- concluded between the two Powers. Selim, under the influence of General Sebastiani who was then French ambassador at Constantinople, signed [seized ?] what was considered by him a favourable opportunity for renewing the war with Russia [see below], in which, however, the Turks were defeated both by land and sea. These misfortunes the Janissaries attributed to the new troops or Seymens. … At the end of 3Iay, 1807, the chiefs of the Janissaries and the Ulema had already formed their plans for the overthrow of the Sultan, when Selim accelerated the outbreak by going to the mosque on Friday, accompanied by a body of Seymens and the French ambassador, Sebastiaui. The Janissaries, aroused by this, broke out in open revolt, which soon grew of such a menacing nature by the co-operation of the Mufti, that Selim was compelled to promise the abolition of the Nizam, and the heads of those of his advisers who had promoted the measure. But the insurgents were not satisfied with this: they demanded the abdication of the Sultan, whom the Mufti declared unworthy to be a successor of Muhammad, through his partiality for foreigners, and marched to the Seraglio, to carry their designs into effect. But when the Mufti and the Ulema entered it, they found a new Sultan. Selim, under the conviction that he could not resist the storm his attempts at reform had created, had retired to the Harem, where his nephew, Mustapha, was confined, and led him to the throne: he had then attempted to destroy his own life by a cup of poisoned sherbet, but had been prevented by Mustapha, and was led into the apartments of the Royal Princes, with a promise that he should ever be treated as a friend and an uncle. On the same afternoon, Sultan Mustapha III [IV] (who reigned from 31st May, 1807, to 28th July, 1808) rode in solemn procession for the first time to the great mosque, was invested in the traditional manner with the sabre of Muhammad, then immediately did away with the Nizam Djedid, and restored the old customs. But among the Pachas in the provinces, there were several devoted partisans of reform. The most influential of these was Mustapha Bairaktar, Pacha of Rustchuk, who set out in July 1808, at the head of 18,000 men, to restore Selim to the throne. He succeeded in taking possession of the capital, and keeping the Sultan so long in ignorance of his designs, until he sent him orders to resign the throne in favour of Selim. As the Sultan had only one hour allowed him for consideration, he was so helpless that he followed the advice of the Mufti and had Selim cruelly murdered. As the gates of the Seraglio were not opened at the appointed time, and Bairaktar hurried up to enforce his authority, Selim’s lifeless body was thrown over the wail. Upon this the Pacha ordered the Seraglio to be stormed, seized the Sultan, destroyed all those who had advised the abolition of the plans of reform, and placed Mustapha’s younger brother on the throne. Mahmud II, the second son of Abd-ul-Hamid, was born on the 2nd July, 1785, and was consequently twenty-three years of age when he ascended the throne. . . . Mahmud appointed Mustapha Bairaktar his Grand Vizier, and, regardless of the fate of his predecessor,” restored all the measures of reform which Selim had undertaken. Within three months the Janissaries were again in open rebellion, and on the night of the 14th November, 1808, attacked the Seymens, destroyed a great number of them, and, after storming the new barracks, forced their way into the Grand Vizier’s palace. He fled and appealed to the people for help, but the greater portion abused him as a renegade and joined the rebels. Bairaktar recognised his impending fate, but still ordered the execution of Mustapha, for fear he might reascend the throne. After this he retired with a body of Seymens into a stone tower, where he had before collected a quantity of gunpowder. He defended himself here for some time, but, at last, when the Janissaries rushed up in larger masses to the attack,
Revolutions.
he blew up the tower. The Janissaries then attacked the Seraglio, and, but for the fact that Mahmud was the last legitimate descendant of the race of Osman, they would have taken his life. But even this, probably, would not have saved him, had he not sent a deputation to the insurgents and given an unconditional assent to their demands. … As an additional guarantee for his own safety on the throne?, ensanguined with the blood of his uncle and his brother, Mahmud ordered his brother’s son, a child of three mouths old, to be strangled, and four of the Sultanas to be thrown into the Bosphorus. The reign of Mahmud is one of the longest and most important in the whole of Turkish history. It commenced with war. The Emperor Alexander menaced him on the Danube: the Hospodar of Servia, Czerny George, had rebelled against him. The campaign of the Turks in 1809, was, consequently, not a prosperous one. The contest lasted till 1812, when it was ended by the treaty of Bucharest, which surrendered the whole of Bessarabia, as far as the Pruth, to Russia. At the same time the Russian protectorate of the Greek Christian subjects of the Porte, which had been stipulated in the treaty of Kudjuk Kainardji, was again confirmed.”—Sir J. Porter, Turkey, v. 1, pp. 194-204.
Al.so IN: Sir E. S. Creasv, Hist, of the Ottomnn Turks, eh. 21-24.
A. D. 1798.—In the Coalition against France. —War declared. See France: A. D. 17981799 (auoust — April).
A. D. 1806-1807.—Alliance with Napoleon, and hostilities with Russia and England.— British fleet before Constantinople—Its humiliating retreat. — The English again in Egypt—Disastrous failure of their expedition. —”Before the end of 1806, Russia had driven Selim into the arms of France; and war was declared at the Porte just after Napoleon’s victories in Prussia had filled Alexander with alarm. His troops had overrun some Turkish territory before war was declared; but just at this juncture he wanted all his forces for the defence of his own frontier. He dreaded the effects of withdrawing them from the Turkish provinces, which would immediately fight for France; but he must do it. He besought the British to undertake another of those ‘ diversions’ which began to sound so disagreeably to the ears of English men. . . . The Grenville Cabinet . . . gave orders to Sir John Duckworth, then cruising off Ferrol, to join Admiral Louis at the mouth of the Dardanelles. . . . Neither the efforts of Sebastiani [French representative at Constantinople] . . . nor any other warning that the English were coming, had roused the Turks to make the slightest preparation. The ships sailed proudly up the strait [February, 1807], undelayed by the lire of the forts at the narrowest part of the channel, and belching out flames and cannonballs as they went. They took and burned some Turkish ships, and appeared before Constantinople, to the horror of the whole population, who were absolutely without means of defence. The Divan would have yielded at once; but Sebastiani prevented it, and instigated a negotiation which proved a fatal snare to Sir John Duckworth, notwithstanding express warnings and instructions, strong and clear, from Lord Collingwood. He was unwilling to destroy the 1 city, and shoot down the defenceless inhabitants; and lie allowed himself to be drawn on, from day to day, exchanging notes and receiving promises. . . . Meantime, not a moment was lost by Sebastiani and the Turks, whom he was instructing in Napoleon’s methods of warfare. Women and children, Christians and Mohammedans, worked day and night at the defences; and in a few days the whole coast was bristling with artillery, and the chance was over. . . . There was nothing to be done but to get away as safely as they yet might, . . . For thirty miles (reckoning the windings of the channel) the ships ran the gauntlet of an incessant tire — and such a fire as was never seen before. Stone balls, weighing 700 or 800 lbs., broke down the masts, crushed in the decks, snapped the rigging, and amazed the hearts of the sailors. The hills smoked from end to end, and the roar of the artillery rolled from side to side. In another week, Sir J. Duckworth declared in his dispatch, any return would have been impossible. The news of this singular affair spread fast over Europe. Every body thought the expedition gallantly conceived, and miserably weak in its failure. . . . So ended the second of the ‘ diversions’ proposed under the Grenville Ministry. The third legacy of this kind that they left was a diversion on the side of Egypt, For some time, a notion had been gaining ground, in the minds of English politicians, that the Sultan would, some day soon, be giving Egypt to Napoleon, in return for the aid afforded to Constantinople, on the Danube, and elsewhere. Egypt was in an unhappy state. Mohammed Alee, the Viceroy, was at feud with the Memlooks; and the Arab inhabitants were made a prey of by both. The Grenville Ministry thought that a diversion in that direction would be of great service to Russia, and great injury to Napoleon; and they confidently reckoned on being enthusiastically received by the Arab inhabitants, and probably by the Memlooks also. In laying their plans, however, they strangely underrated the forces and the ability of Mohammed Alee; and they sent only between 4,000 and 5,000 men to the mouth of the Nile, instead of an army large enough to cope with the able and warlike Pasha of Egypt, and his Albanian troops. The small British force was drafted from the troops in Sicily. It landed without opposition on the 17th of March, supposing that Sir John Duckworth must by this time have conquered the Sultan, and that his province of Egypt would come very easily into our hands. No opposition was made to the landing of the troops, and Alexandria capitulated immediately. Only seven lives were lost on the British side. Within the city, however, no provisions were found.” A detachment of 1,200 men sent to Rosetta for supplies were trapped in the city by Mohammed Alee’s Albanians, and 400 of them, with their general, were shot down in the streets. Then Kosetta was besieged, with results of disastrous failure and the loss of 1,000 or 1,200 more men. General Fraser, the Commander, “was discouraged from home, and hourly harassed by the enemy. . . . More and more of the enemy came up as his little force dwindled away; and at last, on the appearance of a column which he was unable to encounter, he sent out a flag of truce, with an offer to evacuate Egypt on the restoration of the prisoners taken since the invasion. This was in August, 1807; and in September the last English soldier left the mouth of the Nile.
Janissaries.
| By this time, the Sultan had declared war against
England, and had caused a seizure of all the
British propertv in his dominions.”—II. Marti-
neau, Hint, of Eng., 1800-1815, bk. 2, eh. 1.
A. D. 1807.—Accession of Mustapha IV.
A. D. 1807. — Schemes of Napoleon and
Alexander I. at Tilsit for the partition of
Turkey. See Germany: A. D. 1807 (junk—
I July).
A. D. 1808.—Accession of Mahmud II. A. D. 1821-1820.—Revolt and recovery of independence by the Greeks.—Battle of Navarino.—Treaty of Adrianople. See Greece: A. D. 1821-1839.
A. D. 1822-1823.—The Congress of Verona. See Verona, Conoress Of.
A. D. 1826.—Reforms of Mahmud II.—Insurrection of the Janissaries.—Their subjugation and destruction.—” While the struggle in Greece was proceeding, Mahmud had been busily engaged with his internal reforms, many of which were of a nature to offend the prejudices of his subjects. His great object was to give a European character to the institutions and the manners of his country. He introduced the western style of dress into Turkey; abandoned the use of the turban, which Mohammedans generally regard with much veneration; and gave musical and theatrical entertainments within the sacred enclosure of the Seraglio. He resolved also to recommence the military reforms of his uncle Selim, and again to establish the Nizam Jedid, or body of troops organized after European models. This last design roused once more the savage fanaticism of the Janizaries. On the 15th of J une, 1826, when the Sultan and the Grand Vizier were in the country, the dissatisfied troops rose in insurrection, and committed great excesses. The Grand Vizier, hastily recalled to the metropolis, took measures for vindicating his master’s authority, and at once found himself
j supported, not only by the new troops, but by the Ulemas and Students. Mahmud arrived shortly afterwards at the Seraglio, and by his
J orders the Mufti unfolded the standard of the Prophet, and summoned all faithful Mohammedans to rally round that holy symliol. The city was soon divided into two hostile factions. The Janizaries concentrated their forces in one of the great squares, and threw up entrenchments. The supporters of the Sultan gathered in their front, and an attack was made by ordnance, before which the Janizaries retired into their fortified barracks, where they continued to fight with the resolution of despair. . . . The building was presently on fire from one end to the other. The frightful struggle was continued in the midst of the flames; all who endeavoured to escape were at once shot down; and before the day was over 6,000 Janizaries had perished at the hands of their fellow-troops. Fifteen thousand who had not taken part in the movement were exiled to different places in Asia Minor, and on the following day a Hatti-Sherif pronounced the abolition
: of a corps which had contributed so much to the military predominance of Turkey, but which had at length become a source of internal danger too great to be suffered.”—E. Oilier, CasseU’s 111. Hint, of the R it mo- Turkish War, r. 1, ch. 28.
A. D. 1826-1829.—Convention of Ackerman. —War with Russia.—Surrender of Varna and Silistria.—Disastrous battle of Koulevscha.—
I Treaty of Hadrianople.—Cessions of territory. —”It was not to be expected that an event so remarkable as the destruction of the Janizaries would fail to’be taken advantage of by the court of St. Petersburg. The Emperor Nicholas had brought with him to the Russian throne a thorough determination to carry out that aggressive policy of theEmpressCatherine, of which the terms of the celebrated treaty of Kutschouc-Kainardji [see above: A. D. 1768-1774] afforded so striking an illustration, and the annihilation of the Ottoman army, as well as the distracted condition of many of the provinces of that empire, afforded an opportunity too tempting to be neglected. The Czar, therefore, demanded that the Sultan should conclude with him a treaty, the provisions of which were made the subject of discussion at Ackerman, a town in Bessarabia; and’Mahmoud, pressed by the necessity of his condition, . . . had found it requisite to conclude the arrangement, and the celebrated convention of Ackerman was ratified in October 1826. This treaty proved of great importance to Russia. In addition to other provisions, it recognised the whole stipulations of the two treaties of Bucharest and Kainardji, by which Russia claimed the right to interpose in behalf of the members of the Greek church in the Ottoman dominions. . . . During the year which succeeded the ratification of the convention of Ackerman, Russia was occupied with the Persian war, which was prosecuted with great vigour by General Paskewitch, by whom very considerable advantages were obtained; and in November 1827 the treaty of Tourkmantchai was concluded between Russia and Persia. … It left the Emperor … at leisure to carry out those hostile intentions which his ready interference in the affairs of Greece, and a variety of other considerations, clearly proved him to entertain. The approaching war was indicated by the mutual recriminations of the hostile powers. Russia accused the Porte of an endeavour to cause a revolution in the Caucasus, and of a violation of treaties by closing the Bosphorus against Russian ships, and by its conduct towards its Christian subjects. There was no inconsiderable foundation for such a complaint, and especially for the latter part of it. . . . Both sides immediately prepared for the struggle, which a variety of circumstances have proved that the Czar had long contemplated, and only waited for a suitable opportunity of entering upon. . . . In the month of May [1828] the [Russian] force began to assemble on the banks of the Pruth, and crossed that river at three different points. Being unopposed by the Ottomans, the Russian forces almost immediately entered Jassy and Bucharest, took possession of Galatz, and in a few weeks had occupied the whole of the left bank of the Danube. To accomplish as rapidly as possible the objects of the campaign, as well as to avoid having their very widely extended line exposed to the enemy, it was resolved by the leaders of the Russian forces to cross the Danube at Brahilow, and thence to advance with rapidity upon Silistria, Varna, and Schumla. This resolution they immediately proceeded to carry into effect. . . . About the middle of July, the Russian force under General Rudiger on the right, and Generals Woinoff and Diebitch on the left wing, accompanied by the Emperor Nicholas, moved towaul Schumla; and the Ottoman army, whose instructions were to avoid general actions, and to
throw their whole energy upon the defence of I heir fortifications, having engaged in battle with the enemy, retired within the entrenched camp surrounding that fortress, which now contained a force of 40,000 men. . . . The Emperor . . . resolved … to leave a corps of observation of 30,000 men before Schumla, under Gcnenil Wittgenstein, and to direct the principal efforts of his army, in the first instance, to the reduction of Varna. … On the 5th of September, after having been absent at Odessa for about a month, during which he was engaged making arrangements for obtaining levies from Russia, and in negociating loans in Holland, the Emperor Nicholas arrived at Varna, to inspect the progress and encourage the operations of the besiegers. . . . The besieging force, towards the end of August, amounted to 40,000 men, which, on the arrival of the Emperor, were reinforced by more than 20,000, with a great addition to the artillery already possessed by the invading army. This large force was further supported by the Russian fleet. . . . The details of the siege exhibit a series of assaults repulsed with the utmost valour and spirit by the besieged, and entailing an immense loss upon the Russians, both in men and superior officers; but the circumstance that the reinforcement sent to relieve the garrison could not approach, so closely was the place invested, and the destruction of a part of the walls by the cannon of the Russians, led to a surrender, and Jussouf Pasha delivered up the fortress to the Emperor on the 10th of October, after a siege of more than two months. The utmost efforts were made to reduce Silistria, after Varna had been surrendered, but the advance of the season, and the difficulties of the attempt, as well as the disastrous circumstances of the Russian army before Schumla, soon proved that nothing more could be attempted till the following spring. The campaign, therefore, was brought to a conclusion, and orders were issued for the Russians to retire beyond the Danube, and take up their winter quarters in Wallachia. The fall of Brahilow and Varna were the only important events of the campaign of 1828 in Europe, and even these successes had been attained at a vast expense of human life. Out of nearly 160,000 men who had crossed the Danube at the beginning of the campaign, only about one-half remained. … In Asia operations were carried on by the Russians with equal vigour and much more success, in consequence, in a great measure, of the military genius and experience of General Paskewitch, who commanded the troops on the east of the Black Sea. . . . The first attack of the Russians in Asia was made upon the fortress of Anapa. . . . After a siege of about a month, the place was taken, with 85 guns and 3,000 prisoners, and the fleet sailed immediately to Varna. . . . After some other successes, General Paskewitch resolved upon attacking the town and fortress of Akhalzikh, a very important place in the pashalik of that name, and which was not only strongly fortified by nature and art, but had for its chief strength a resolute garrison of 10,000 Ottomans, besides the armed inhabitants of the place. The Sultan’s troops defended this important fortress with the most undaunted resolution. . . . The surrender of Akhalzikh was followed by that of other important places of strength, which closed the campaign of 1828 in Asia. . . . The campaign of 1828 had rendered the most active preparations requisite on the part of both belligerents for the commencement of hostilities in the following spring. The Ottoman soldiers, according to their usual custom, hastened from the garrisons to pass the winter in their homes, but the utmost efforts were made by the Porte to gather an adequate force to meet the exigencies of the struggle so soon to be renewed. Although only 10,000 men were left in Schumla during the winter, 40,000 assembled in that fortress early in spring. They were, however, for the most part new levies. . . . The Russians, on the other hand, were no less energetic in their arrangements. … It was impossible, however, before the month of May, from the condition of the Danube, to commence the campaign with the whole force, but by the tenth of that month the passage of the river was completed at Hirchova and Kalavatsch, below Silistria, the siege of which was immediately begun, while General Kouprianoff was stationed with a force at Pravadi, a fortress on the east of Schumla, and which, lying in the line of communication between Silistria and Varna, was important to the Russians as the means of keeping open a communication between the army of General Roth near Varna and the troops destined to act upon Silistria. Redschid Pasha, who on being recalled from Greece had been appointed Grand Vizier, had arrived at Schumla on the 21st of March, and on perceiving the position of the invading army, formed the well-conceived design of attacking Pravadi and the force under General Roth. . . . This movement of the Vizier became immediately known to General Roth, who by means of a courier conveyed information of it to Count Diebitch. That General was too acute not to perceive the purpose of his adversary, and too enterprising not to endeavour immediately to take advantage of it. The Count therefore adopted a movement of the highest importance, and which, indeed, had the effect of deciding the campaign. Instead of marching to attack Redschid Pasha at Pravadi, he resolved to intercept his communication with the fortress he had quitted, and thus compel the Ottoman general cither to come to a general engagement, which could hardly fail to result to the advantage of the Russians, or to fight his way towards Schumla through the Russian army, or leave the fortress of Schumla to its fate, which, feebly garrisoned as it was, could not be long delayed. This skilful manoeuvre was no sooner resolved upon than it was carried into execution. . . . While the Russian force were rapidly advancing towards Koulevscha, a village between Pravadi and Schumla, and scarcely three miles from the latter, the Grand Vizier remained wholly ignorant of the fact that Diebitch had quitted Silistria, and persisted in the belief that the only opponents of his retreat to Schumla were Generals Roth and Rudiger. . . . The mistake was fatal. The Ottoman cavalry attacked the infantry of the Russians, who were overwhelmed by their charge; and Diebitch, having waited in expectation that the Vizier would descend from the eminence on which he was posted to complete his supposed victory, and finding that he did not make this movement, broke from his concealment among the hills, and suddenly attacked the Ottoman troops with his whole force. The effect was instantaneous. A universal panic seized the Vizier’s forces, his cavalry and infantry fled in
confusion, every attempt to bring them to a stand proved abortive, and he himself escaped with difficulty. The artillery and baggage all fell into the hands of the enemy. . . . The muster at Schumla on the return of the Vizier and his remaining troops exhibited the magnitude of their loss. Out of a fine army of 40,000 men, who a few days before had marched from the fortress full of confidence, only 12.000 foot and about 6,000 cavalry remained. After the fatal battle of Koulevscha, the siege of Silistria was carried on with redoubled vigour, and on the 30th of June the fortress»surrendcrcd, when the whole garrison were made prisoners of war, and to the number of 8.000, and the Russians found on the ramparts 238 cannon, in addition to those on board the vessels in the harbour. The fall of Silistria now determined the Russian commariderin-chief to push across the Balkans. . . . After defeating with great facility such troops as opposed their advance, the Russian armv pressed on with the utmost activity towards Hadrianople, and entered the city not only unopposed, but amidst the rejoicings of a multitude of the Greek population. . . . The terror which this extraordinary event inspired at Constantinople may easily be imagined to have been extreme. The very heart of the empire had been assailed by the victorious invaders in Europe, while the tidings from the Asiatic provinces of the defeats sustained by the Sultan’s forces opposed to General Paskewitch, greatly contributed to the public alarm. … In the midst of this tumult of public feeling, the ambassadors of England and Austria exerted themselves to the utmost to bring about a pacification; and . . . the Sultan reluctantly agreed to the conclusion of a treaty of peace. . . . The celebrated treaty of Hadrianople, which concluded the war of 1828-29, . . . contained sixteen distinct articles, by which, among other matters, the following conditions were agreed upon: — The principalities of Wallachiaand Moldavia, and all the conquered places in Bulgaria and Rouinelia, were restored to the Porte, with the exception of the islands at the mouth of the Danube, which were to remain the possession of Russia. In Asia all the recent couquests were to revert to the Porte, with the exception of Anapa, on the north-eastern shore of the Black Sea, several important fortresses, together with an extensive district situated to the north and east of a line of demarcation supposed to be drawn from the then existing boundary of the province of Gouriel, and thence by that of Imeritia direct to the point where the frontiers of Kars unite with those of Georgia. The conditions of the treaties of Kainardji, Bucharest, and Ackerman were confirmed; . . . the passage of the Dardanelles was declared open to all Russian merchant ships, as well as the undisputed navigation of the Black Sea; an indemnity for losses by Russian subjects was fixed at £750,000, to be paid in eighteen months; and the expenses of the war were to be paid to the Russian Government, amounting to 10,000,000ducats, about £5,000,000. … To this treaty two separate acts were annexed, the provisions of which are of scarcely less importance than the treaty itself. By these acts it was arranged that the Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia should be elected for life instead of for seven years; that no interference in the affairs of these provinces by any of the officers of the Porte should take
revolt.
place; that no fortified towns, nor any establishment of Muslims, should be retained by the Porte on the left bank of the Danube; that the Turkish towns on that bank of the river should belong to Wallachia; and that the Mussulmans who possessed property in such places should be required to sell it in the space of eighteen months. . . . The conclusion of these treaties, on the 14th September 1829, terminated the war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire.”—R. W. Fraser, Turkey, Ancient and Modern, eh. 80-31.
Also In: Sir A. Alison, Hist, of Europe, from 1815 to 1852, ch. 15.
A. D. 1830.— Recognition of the autonomy of Servia. See Balkan And Danubian States: 14-19th Centuries (seuvia).
A. D. 1831-1840.—Rebellion of Mehemed Ali, Pasha of Egypt.—Intervention of Russia and the Western Powers.— Egypt made an hereditary pashalik.— “The peace of Adrianople (1829) had greatly discredited the authority of the Porte; insurrections multiplied, and Turkish armies had to enter Bosnia and Albania. In these and all other matters by which the embarrassment of the Porte was increased, the ambitious Mehemed Ali, Pasha of Egypt, had a hand. As payment for his services against the Greeks, he had demanded the pashalik of Damascus. Sultan Mahmoud II. had refused the demand, and only given him the promised Candia. Hence, while the Western powers were occupied with the consequences of the July revolution [in France], and all Europe appeared to be on the verge of a new upheaval, he undertook to seize his booty for himself. In consequence of a quarrel witli Abdallah, Pasha of Acre, Ibrahim Pasha [son of Mehemed Ali], notorious for his barbarous conduct of the war in Peloponnesus, crossed the Egyptian frontier, October 20th, 1831, with an army organized on the European system, took Gaza, Jaffa and Jerusalem without resistance, and besieged Acre, which was resolutely defended by Abdallah. Mehemed Ali now demanded both pashaliks — Damascus and Acre. The sultan commanded him to evacuate Syria. The demand was naturally refused; so Mehemed and his son Ibrahim were outlawed. But the latter proceeded witli his operations, took Acre by storm May 25th, 1832, and entered Damascus. In the mean time, a Turkish army, under Hussein Pasha, had advanced into Syria. Mehemed Pasha, Hussein’s lieutenant, was defeated at Horns, July 9th. Hussein himself, attempting to retrieve this loss, was defeated at Beylan July 27th, and his army scattered. The sultan sent a new army against Ibrahim, under Rcshid Pasha, the Grand Vizier, who had displayed great efficiency in the reduction of the Albanians and Bosnians. Reshid . . . was utterly defeated at Konieh December 20th, and was himself taken prisoner. The sultan was in a critical situation. He could not at the moment bring together another considerable army, while Ibrahim had 100,000 well-trained troops, and tlie road to Constantinople lay open before him.” Russia, having no wish to see the energetic Pasha of Egypt in possession of that coveted capital, offered her help to the sultan and he was driven to accept it. “A Russian fleet appeared in the Bosphorus, and landed troops at Scutari, while a Russian army was on the march from the Danube to cover Constantinople. . . . At length England and France perceived how dangerous it was
to forget the East in their study of the DutchBelgian question. Their ambassadors had enough to do, by a hasty peace, to make Russia’s help unnecessary. As their threats made no impression on the victorious Mehemed Ali, they filled the sultan with distrust of Russia, and by representing a cession of territory to his vassal as the lesser of the two evils, persuaded him into the peace of Kutayah (May 6th, 1833), by which Mehemed Ali received the whole of Syria and the territory of Adana, in south-eastern Asia Minor. Russia had to retire with her object unattained, but had no sooner been thrown out at the front door than she came in at the back. She called the sultan’s attention to the favor shown to the insatiable pasha by England and France in the peace of Kutayah, and concluded with him, July 8th, 1833, the treaty of UnkiarSkelessi, by which he entered into a defensive alliance with Russia for eight years, and pledged himself to permit no foreign vessel of war to pass through the Dardanelles. The Western powers took this outwitting very ill, and from that time on kept a sharp eye on Constantinople.” Mehemed Ali was meantime giving another direction to his ambition. “The west coast of Arabia, as far as the English post at Aden, had been in his possession siuce 1829. He now sought to extend his sway over the eastern coast, and subdue the sultan of Muscat. … If this were to continue, the two most important roads to the East Indies, by Suez and by the Persian Gulf, would be in the hands of Slehemed Ali. . . . With Egypt, Syria, and Arabia in his hands, England’s position in the East would receive a blow that must be felt. So it was a foregone conclusion winch side England would take. In 1838 she concluded with the Porte a commercial treaty by which the abolition of all monopolies, as well as free exportation from all parts of the Turkish empire, including Egypt and Syria, was secured to her. Mehemed All hesitated about accepting this treaty; and Mahmoud, full of hate against a vassal who threatened ultimately to devour him, declared him a traitor, deprived him of all his dignities, and caused an army to advance into Syria under Ilasiz Pasha. But again fortune was not favorable to the Turks. In their camp, as military adviser of the commander-inchief, was a Prussian captain, Hellmuth von Moltke. For two years he had been assisting the sultan in planning and putting into execution military reforms. Recognizing the weakness and unreliable character of the Turkish army, he advised Hasiz Pasha to fall back on the strong camp at Biridshik, bring up the re-enforcements which were under way, and then risk a battle. But the Pasha would not listen to Moltke’s advice, pronouncing retreat a disgrace. He was completely routed at Xisib, on the Eu phrates, June 24th, 1839, and his army scattered. For the second time the road to Constantinople lay open to Ibrahim. Misfortunes fell thick and fast upon the Turks. Sultan Mahmoud died June 30th, and the empire fell to a sixteen-year old youth, his son Abdul Medshid. Five days later, Capudan Pasha, with the Turkish fleet, sailed out of the Dardanelles under orders to attack the Egyptians. Instead of this he went over to Mehemed Ali with his whole fleet — in consequence of French bribery, it was said. . . . In order to prevent Turkey from casting herself a second time into Russia’s arms, four great powers — England, France, Austria, and Prussia— declared, July 27th, 1839, that they would themselves take the Eastern question in hand. To save herself from being wholly left out, Russia had to give her consent, and become a party to the treaty. But there were very different views as to the way in which the question was to be settled. France, which was striving after the control of the Mediterranean, and which, since Napoleon’s campaign, had turned its eves toward Egypt, wished to leave its friend Mehemed Ali in full possession. England saw her interests endangered by the pasha, thought France’s occupation of Algiers quite enough, and was afraid that if Turkey were too weak she might become the defenceless prey of Russia. The latter wished at no price to allow the energetic pasha to enter upon the inheritance of Turkey, or even of a part of it, and was pleased at seeing the cordial understanding between France and England destroyed. Austria anil Prussia supported England and Russia, and so France was left alone. The Anglo-Russian view found expression in the quadruple alliance which the great powers, with the exception of France, concluded in London, July 15th, 1840. By this the hereditary possession of the pashalik of Egypt, and the possession for life of a part of Syria, were secured to Mehemed Ali, in case he submitted to the conclusions of the conference within ten days. . . . The allied powers began hostilities against Mehemed Ali, who, relying on French assistance, refused to submit. The AngloAustrian fleet sailed to the Syrian coast, and took Beirut and Acre; and Alexandria was bombarded by Commodore Napier. This and the fall of the Thiers ministry brought Mehemed Ali to a full realization of his mistake. He might consider himself lucky in being allowed to hold Egypt as hereditary pashalik upon evacuating Syria, Arabia, and Caudia, and restoring the Turkish fleet. Fortius favor he had to thank England, which sought by this means to secure his friendship and the Suez road to India. The catastrophe of the ‘sick man’ [the Turk] was again put off for a few years.” — W. Mllller, Political Hist, of Recent Times, sect. 11.
and after.
Also In: A. A. Paton, Hist, of the Egyptian Revolution, v. 2, ch. 1-20. —C. A. Fyffe, Hist, of Modern Europe, v. 2, ch. 6.—S. Walpole, Hist, of England from 1815, ch. 16 (v. 3).
A. D. 1839.—Accession of Abdul Medjid.
A. D. 1853-1856.—The Crimean War. See Russia: A. D. 1853-1854, to 1854-1856.
A. D. 1861-1876.—The reign of Abd-ul-Aziz, and accession of Abd-ul-Hamid. — “Troubles broke out in the Lebanon in 1860, a French army was dispatched to restore order, and in the ad j ustment of rival claims an opportunity was afforded to Lord Dufferin for displaying those diplomatic talents for which he is renowned. In 1861 the Sultan Abd-ul-Mejid died, and with him passed away the hope of regenerating Turkey. His brother and successor Abd-ul-Aziz was an ignorant bigot, whose extravagance brought his country to avowed insolvency (1875), and thus deprived her of that sympathy which is seldom given to the impecunious. The only remarkable thing he did was to travel. No Ottoman Sultan had ever before left his own dominions, except on the war path, but Abd-ul-Aziz ventured even as far as London, without, however, awakening any enthusiasm on the part of his Allies. In 1876 he
was deposed, and—found dead. How he came by his death is a matter of doubt, but his end is said to have turned the brain of his successor, Murad V., a son of Abd-ul-Mejid, who after three months was removed as an imbecile, and succeeded by his brother, . . . Abd-ul-Hamid.” —S. Lane-Poole, The Story of Turkey, ch. 17.
A. D. 1861-1877.—Union of Wallachia and Moldavia.— Revolt in Bosnia and Herzegovina.—Reforms demanded by the Great Powers.—War with Servia.—Conference at Constantinople.—Russian preparations for war.— “Before four years were/ncr [after the termination of the Crimean War by the Treaty of Paris], one of the chief stipulations of the treaty was set aside. Wallachia and Moldavia, which it had beeu the policy of the Powers to separate, displayed a constant desire to join. Two of the great Continental Powers — France and Russia — favoured the junction. England, Austria, and Turkey, thinking that the union would ultimately lead to their independence, opposed their fusion under one prince. At last, after discussions, which at one moment seemed likely to rekindle the flames of war, an administrative union was arranged, which resulted, in due course, in the formal union of the two provinces in 1861. [In 1858, the two provinces chose the same prince, or hospodar, in the person of Prince John Couza, who took the title of Prince of Roumania. The Porte protested, but was induced, in 1861, to recognize this union of the coronets. Prince Couza aspired to absolutism, and was forced to abdicate in 1866. Then a German, Prince Charles of Hohenzollern, was chosen by the two provinces to be his successor.] Thus, five years after the Peace of Paris, one of the stipulations on which England had insisted was surrendered. In 1870 the Franco-German War led to the obliteration of another of them. In November, when the armies of France were either beaten or besieged, Russia repudiated the clause of the Treat3- of Paris which had limited the forces of Russia and Turkey in the Black Sea. The declaration of the Russian Government came as a painful shock to the British people. The determination of a great European state to tear up the clause of a treaty excited indignation. It was recollected, moreover, that it was for the sake of this clause that the Crimean War had been prolonged after the Vienna negotiations: and that all the blood which had been shed, and all the money which had been spent, after the spring of 1855, were wasted in its abandonment. . . . All that diplomacy was able to do was to lessen the shock by persuading the Russian Government to submit its proposal for the abrogation of the clause to a conference. . . . The conference met. … It had practically nothing to do but to record its assent to the Russian proposal. . . . For five years more the Eastern Question remained undisturbed. In the spring of 1875 an insurrection broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, two of the northern provinces of European Turkey. The Porte failed to quench the disturbance: and, its efforts to do so increasing its pecuniary embarrassments, was forced in the autumn to repudiate the claims of its many creditors. . . . In the meanwhile the insurrection continued to spread, and attracted the attention of the great European Powers. At the instigation of Austria a note was drawn up [by Count Andrassy, and known, therefore, as the Andrassy Note], which was at once signed by all the European Powers except England, and which was ultimately accepted by England also, declaring that ‘the promises “of reform made by the Porte had not been carried into effect, and that some combined action by the Powers of Europe was necessary to insist on the fulfilment of the many engagements which Turkey had made and broken.’ As the note failed to effect its object, the representatives of the Northern Powers—Germany, Austria, and Russia — met at Berlin, proposed a suspension of arms for two months, and intimated that if Turkey in the two months failed to fulfil her broken promises, ‘force would be used to compel her ‘ to do so. The British Government, unwilling to join in a threat, refused to sign this new note. The insurrection went on; Servia, sympathising with the insurgents, declared war against Turkey; Russian officers and Russian troops fought in the Servian battalions; and Russia herself, setting her legions in motion, evidently prepared for hostilities. When these events occurred, large numbers of the English people were prepared to support the Turk. Though they had been partially estranged from the cause of Turkey by the repudiation of the Ottoman debt in the previous autumn, they recollected the sacrifices of the Crimean War; they were irritated with the manner in which one part of the Treaty of Paris had been torn up in 1870; and they were consequently prepared to resist any further movement on the part of Russia. Tiie Porte, however, dreading the extension of revolt, allowed its officers to anticipate disorder by massacre. The atrocious cruelty with which this policy was executed [especially in Bulgaria — see Balkan and Danubian States: A. D. 1S75-1878] excited a general outburst of indignation in this country [England]; and the British Ministry, whose leader had hitherto displayed much sympathy with the Turks, found himself forced to observe a strict neutrality. In the short war which ensued in the autumn of 1876, the Servian troops proved no match for the Turkish battalions. At the request or command of Russia the Porte was forced to grant an armistice to the belligerents; and, on the suggestion of the British Ministry, a Conference of the Great Powers was held at Constantinople to provide for the better government of the Turkish provinces. The Constantinople Conference, held at the beginning of 1877, formed in many respects an exact parallel to the Vienna Conference held in the summer of 1855. . . . The Porte rejected all the proposals on which the other Powers were agreed. … In each case the failure of the Conference was followed by war. But the parallel ends at this point. … In the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-8, Turkey was left to fight her own battle alone.”—S. Walpole, Foreign Relations, ch. 3.
Also Is: E. Oilier, CamelVs 111. Hist, of the Russo-Turkisk War, v. 1, ch. 1-10.— Duke of Argyll, Tlie Eastern Question, v. 1, eh. 3-9.— S. Menzies, Turkey Old and Xeip, bk. 4, ch. 4 (v. 2).
A. D. 1877-1878. — War with Russia.— Heroic defense of Plevna.—Defeat and surrender.—” Russia had already massed large numbers of troops on her frontier, and Turkey was also engaged in the work of mobilization. On the 34th April the Emperor of Russia issued a manifesto to his subjects, in which he recited
the interest of the empire in the Christian population of the Balkan peninsula, and the general desire that their condition should be ameliorated. He declared that all efforts at peace had been exhausted. … He had given the orders for the army to cross the frontier, and the advance upon Turkey was begun without delay. . . . The Turks had not been idle, though their preparations were by no means as complete as those of Russia. They had massed heavy bodies of troops along the Danube, and were prepared to resist the movements of the Russians south of that stream. . . . The first crossing [of the Russians] was made at Galatz, on the 22d June, by General Zimmermann, who went over with two regiments in pontoons and drove out the Turks who were posted on the heights on the opposite shore. Having obtained a footing in the Dobrudja, as the peninsula between the Danube and Black Sea is called, the Russians were able to throw bridges over the great stream, by which the whole left wing of the army moved across. Meantime the right wing, on the 26th June, sent a pontoon force over the Danube from Simnitza, under command of General Skobeleff, who drove out the small force of Turks posted there, though not without hard fighting. More pontoons followed, and then a bridge was thrown across on which the army could march. . . . By the first week of July the whole Russian army was safely encamped on the southern bank of the Danube, and getting in readiness to assume the offensive. . . . The advance did not begin in force until after the middle of the month. But before that time General Gourko . . . had pushed forward on the road to the Balkans, heading first for Tirnova. . . . On the 5th July the cavalry occupied Biela, . . . and on the 7th Gourko was in possession of Tirnova. . . . The Emperor joined the army at Biela on the 8th or 9th. Gourko was soon reported past the Balkans. . . . The first check of the Russians was at Plevna. They had previously captured Nicopolis with its garrison of 7,000 men, having themselves lost about 1,300 officers and men killed and wounded. Orders had been given to occupy Plevna as soon as possible, and Baron Krudener sent forward General Schilder-Schuldner to carry out the orders. . . . Schilder-Schuldner had 6,500 men and 46 guns in the division with which he went to capture Plevna; he was attacked by a vastly superior force of Turks before he had reached his objective point, and the first battle of Plevna was disastrous to the Russians. . . . Nearly 3,000 men and 74 officers were killed or wounded. . . . The Russians retired to Nicopolis, and the Turks set to work to strengthen Plevna. . . . From the 20th to the 30th of July the Russians were engaged in bringing up reinforcements and getting ready for another attack. An order came for the assault of the Turkish position; Baron Krudener did not believe the assault advisable, but the command of the Grand Duke Nicholas left him no discretion.” The assault was made on the 31st of July, and was repulsed, with a loss to the Russians of 170 olliccrs and 7.136 men. “There was nothing for the Russians to do but send for reinforcements, and wait until they arrived. The advance into Turkey had received a severe check, from which recovery was not easy. From the offensive the Russians were thrown upon the defensive, and all as the result of a single battle of six or eight hours’ duration. Happily for Russia, the Turkish army had no competent leader, or the army of the C’/.ar might have been captured or drowned in the Danube. The Turks had three armies in the field. . . . Mehemet Ali was at Shumla with 65,000 men; Osman Pasha at Plevna, with 50,000; and Suleiman Pasha at Yeni Zagra, with 40,000. . . . The order of the Czar for reinforcements was quicklv issued, and resulted in the despatch of 120,000 “regulars and 180,000 militia for the front. With these reinforcements went 460 pieces of artillery. . . . General Gourko took up his position in the Shipka Pass whence Suleiman Pasha sought in vain to dislodge him. . . . Towards the end of August the Russian reinforcements were assembled in such numbers that an advance could again be ventured. . . . The total Russian and Roumanian force for the attack of Plevna amounted to 90,000 men and 440 guns, while the Turks were estimated to have about 56,000 men — and Osman Pasha. . . . The attack began with a bombardment on the 6th September,” which was kept up until the 11th, when the Russians again endeavored to carry the Turkish works by assault. Skobeleff, conspicuous, as he always was, in daring and in success, took one of the redoubts and held it until the next day, waiting vainly for reinforcements which were not sent. Elsewhere the assault failed. “The Russian killed and wounded were estimated at 18,000 to 20,000, and the Turkish about 5,000 less than the Russian. The capture by assault having been given up, the Russians sat down to invoke the aid of that engine, more powerful than all their batteries, the engine of starvation. . . . One by one the roads leading into Plevna were occupied, but it was nearly two months from the terrible battle of the 11th September before the routes for supplies and reinforcements destined for Osman Pasha could be secured. The investment was completed on the 3d November; 120,000 Russians and Roumanians were around Plevna.” On the morning of December 10 the beleaguered Turks made a desperate sortie, attempting to break the line of investment, having failed in which their stout-hearted commander surrendered unconditionally. “With the fall of Plevna and the surrender of its garrison of 40,000 men, the Turkish opposition practically ceased. Within a month from that event General Gourko had captured Sophia, and General Radetsky took the village of Shipka, in the Shipka Puss, and compelled the surrender of a Turkish army of 23,000 men. . . . Gourko and Skobeleff advanced upon Pliilippopolis by different routes and narrowly missed capturing Suleiman Pasha with his entire force. Skobeleff advanced upon Adrianople, which the Turks abandoned, and Slivno and Yeni-Zagra were occupied, all inside of thirty days. Plevna had made the Russians the masters of the situation, and they advanced upon Constantinople, the Turks retiring before them, and occasionally making a feeble resistance. Turkey asked the mediation of England, and finally, despairing of her aid. signed an armistice that became the basis of the treaty of San Stefano.”—T. AV. Knox, Decisive Batiks since Waterloo, ch. 21.— The campaign of the Russians in Bulgaria was accompanied by another in Asiatic Turkey, where they, likewise, met with a temporary check, after pushing their first advance too confidently, and with an insufficient force. They invested Kars
and advanced against Erzeroum, in May, 1877; but were defeated at Seviu and withdrew from both undertakings. Having received reinforcements, they resumed the offensive in October, attacking the main Turkish army, under Mukhtar Pasha, in its strong position at Aladsha, or on the Little Yahni and Great Yahni hills. Their first attack, on the 2d, was repulsed; they repeated it on the 15th with success, driving one wing of the enemy into Kars and forcing the other to surrender. Kars was then l>esieged and taken by assault November 17. The Turks suffered another defeat at Deve-Boyun, near Erzeroum, November 4, and they evacuated Erzeroum itself in February, 1878.—E. Oilier, Cassell’s Illustrated Hist, of tlie Uusso-Tnrkish War.
Also In: V. Baker, The War in Bulgaria.— F. V. Greene, The Russian Army and its Campaif/n in Turkey
A. D. 1878.—Excitement in England over the Russian advance.—The British fleet sent through the Dardanelles.—Arrangement of the Berlin Congress.—”Atthe opening of 1878 the Turks were completely prostrate. The road to Constantinople was clear. Before the English public had time to recover their breath and to observe what was taking place, the victorious armies of Russia were almost within sight of the minarets of Stamboul. Meanwhile the English Government were taking momentous action. . . . Parliament was called together at least a fortnight before the time usual during recent years. The Speech from the Throne announced that her Majesty could not conceal from herself that, should the hostilities between Russia and Turkey unfortunately be prolonged, ‘some unexpected occurrence may render it incumbent on me to adopt measures of precaution.’ This looked ominous to those who wished for peace, and it raised the spirits of the war party. There was a very large and a very noisy war party already in existence. It was particularly strong in London. It embraced some Liberals as well as nearly all Tories. It was popular in the music-halls and the public-houses of London. . . . The men of action got a nickname. They were dubbed the Jingo Party. . . . Some Tyrtfeus of the tap-tub, some Koruer of the music-halls, had composed a ballad which was sung at one of these caves of harmony every night amidst the tumultuous applause of excited patriots. The refrain of this war-song contained the spirit-stirring words: ‘We don’t want to fight, but, by Jingo, if we do, We’ve got the ships, we’ve got the men, we’ve got the money too.’ Some one whose pulses this lyrical outburst of national pride failed to stir called the party of its enthusiasts the Jingoes. . . . The name was caught up at once, and the party were universally known as the Jingoes. . . . The Government ordered the Mediterranean fleet to pass the Dardanelles and go up to Constantinople. The Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that he would ask for a supplementary estimate of six millions for naval and military purposes. Thereupon Lord Carnarvon, the Colonial Secretary, at once resigned. . . . Lord Derby was also anxious to resign, and indeed tendered his resignation, but he was prevailed upon to withdraw it. The fleet meanwhile was ordered back from the Dardanelles to Besika Bay. It had got as far as the opening of the Straits when it was recalled. The Liberal Opposition in tlie House of Commons kept on protesting against the various war measures of the Government, but with little effect. . . . While all this agitation in and out of Parliament was going on . . . the news came that the Turks, utterly broken down, had been compelled to sign an armistice, and an agreement containing a basis of peace, at Adrianople. Then, following quickly on the heels of this announcement, came a report that the Russians, notwithstanding the armistice, were pushing on towards Constantinople with the intention of occupying the Turkish capital. A cry of alarm and indignation broke out in London. One memorable night a sudden report reached the House of Commons that the Russians were actually in the suburbs of Constantinople. The House for a time almost entirely lost its head. The lobbies, the corridors, St. Stephen’s Hall, the great Westminster Hall itself, and Palace Yard beyond it, became filled with wildly excited and tumultuous crowds. If the clamour of the streets at that moment hail been the voice of England, nothing could have prevented a declaration of war against Russia. Happily, however, it was proved that the rumour of Russian advance was unfounded. The fleet was now sent in good earnest through the Dardanelles, and anchored a few miles below Constantinople. Russia at first protested that if the English fleet passed the Straits Russian troops ought to occupy the city. Lord Derby was firm, and terms of arrangement were found — English troops were not to be disembarked, and the Russians were not to advance. Russia was still open to negotiation. Probably Russia had no idea of taking on herself the tremendous responsibility of an occupation of Constantinople. She had entered into a treaty with Turkey, the famous Treaty of San Stefano, by which she secured for the populations of the Christian provinces almost complete independence of Turkey, and was to create a great new Bulgarian State with a seaport on the Egean Sea. The English Government refused to recognise this Treaty. Lord Derby contended that it involved an entire readjustment of the Treaty of Paris, and that that could only be done with the sanction of the Great Powers assembled in Congress. Lord Beaconsfield openly declared that the Treaty of San Stefano would put the whole south-east of Europe directly under Russian influence. Russia offered to submit the Treaty to the perusal, if we may use the expression, of a Congress; but argued that the stipulations which merely concerned Turkey and herself were for Turkey and herself to settle between them. This was obviously an untenable position. . . . Turkey meanwhile kept feebly moaning that she had been coerced into signing the Treaty. The Government determined to call out the Reserves, to summon a contingent of Indian troops to Europe, to occupy Cyprus, and to make an armed landing on the coast of Syria. . . . The last hope of the Peace Party seemed to have vanished when Lord Derby left his office [which he did on the 28th of March]. Lord Salisbury was made Foreign Minister. . . . Lord Salisbury’s first act in the office of Foreign Secretary was to issue a circular in which he declared that it would be impossible for England to enter a Congress which was not free to consider the whole of the provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano. . . . Prince Bismarck had often during these events
shown an inclination to exhibit himself in the new attitude of a peaceful mediator. He now interposed again and issued invitations for a congress to be held in Berlin to discuss the whole contents of the Treaty of San Stefano. After some delay, discussion, and altercation, Russia agreed to accept the invitation on the conditions proposed, and it was finally resolved that a Congress should assemble in Berlin on the approaching June 13. To this Congress it was supposed by most persons that Lord Salisbury would be sent to represent England. Much to the surprise of the public, Lord Beaconsfield announced that he himself would attend, accompanied by Lord Salisbury, and conduct the negotiations in Berlin. The event was, we believe, without precedent. . . . The Congress was held in the Hadzivill Palace, a building with a plain unpretending exterior in one of the principal streets of Berlin, and then in the occupation of Prince Bismarck. The Prince himself presided. . . . The Congress discussed the whole or nearly the whole of the questions opened up by the recent war. . . . The great object of most of the statesmen who were concerned in the preparation of the Treaty which came of the Congress, was to open for the Christian populations of the south-east of Europe a way into gradual self-development and independence. But on the other band it must be owned that the object of some of the Powers, and especially, we are afraid, of the English Government, was rather to maintain the Ottoman Government than to care for the future of the Christian races. These two influences, acting and counteracting on each other, produced the Treaty of Berlin.”—J. McCarthy, Hist, of Our Own Time, ch. 65 (r>. 4).
fynm 